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EXPERIMENTAL  PUNISHMENTS
John F. Stinneford*
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits, under its original meaning, pun-
ishments that are unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice.  The Clause does not
prohibit all new punishments; rather, it directs that when a new punishment is introduced it
should be compared to traditional punishments that enjoy long usage.  This standard presents a
challenge when the government introduces a new method of punishment, particularly one that is
advertised as more “progressive” or “humane” than those it replaces.  It may not always be obvi-
ous, for example, how to compare a prison sentence to a public flogging, or death by lethal
injection to death by hanging.  When the new method of punishment is introduced, it is often an
experimental punishment whose constitutional status is not immediately clear.
This Article shows how usage over time clarifies the constitutional status of experimental
punishments by revealing two types of data that may not be available at the time the punishment
is adopted.  First, the degree of stable reception the punishment achieves over time indicates
whether society has accepted the punishment as consistent with the overall tradition.  The Eighth
Amendment is premised on the idea that long usage is the most reliable method of determining
what is cruel and what is not.  The longer a practice is used, and the more universally it is
received, the more likely it is to comport with the demands of justice.  On the other hand, failure
to achieve long usage may be powerful evidence that a punishment is cruel.  Second, usage over
time can reveal more clearly how harsh the effects of the punishment are in comparison to tradi-
tional punishments.  Innovations in punishment such as long-term solitary confinement, invol-
untary sterilization, and three-drug lethal injection all appeared “progressive” and “humane”
when first adopted, but usage over time has shown their effects to be unjustly harsh in compari-
son with the practices they have replaced.
© 2019 John F. Stinneford.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
Our entire criminal justice system is, in fundamental ways, experimental.
Over the past two centuries, we have repeatedly changed what we do and how
we do it in light of shifting political and social goals.  These changes often
occur quickly and without much understanding of what their effects will be.
They cut across several axes:
What we punish.  We have vastly expanded the scope of the criminal
law, largely through the creation of regulatory crimes.  Many of
these new crimes permit punishment without any showing of blame-
worthy conduct or intent.1  More recently, some legislatures have
1 American law’s transformation from a system that forbade punishment without cul-
pability to one that permitted it happened rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century.
Compare Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1878) (“All punitive legislation contem-
plates some relation between guilt and punishment.  To inflict the latter where the former
does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”), with United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (interpreting a federal felony narcotics statute as not requir-
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moved to permit punishment without culpability by eliminating
traditional affirmative defenses like the insanity defense.2
Why we punish.  The traditional justification for punishment was
retributive justice.3  Today legislatures can draw from a hodgepodge
of penal justifications, including retribution, deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, incapacitation, or almost any regulatory purpose.4
How much we punish.  Numerous innovations in substantive criminal
law, sentencing law, and judicial interpretation of criminal statutes5
have resulted in longer sentences for many common crimes and an
unprecedented level of incarceration.6
ing proof of culpability) (“While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in
regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it,
there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the
purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement.” (citation omitted)).
Although the Supreme Court has expressed various levels of reluctance and regret arising
from the decision to permit strict liability crimes, see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 263 (1952), it has not reversed itself on this point and has done relatively little to
stem the tide of strict liability crimes.  The expansion of the scope of conduct we punish
has led to an explosion in the number of criminal statutes.  For example, estimates of the
number of federal criminal laws range from 4500 to over 300,000. See Richard J. Lazarus,
Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmen-
tal Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2441–42 (1995) (300,000); Stephen F. Smith, Overcom-
ing Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 538 (2012) [hereinafter Smith,
Overcoming Overcriminalization] (4500).  The disparity in these estimates appears to arise
from the decision to count only the criminal statutes themselves, or also the many federal
regulations that are enforceable as federal crimes.
2 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2019) (“It shall be a defense to a prosecu-
tion under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
the culpable mental state required as an element of the crime charged.  Mental disease or
defect is not otherwise a defense.”).
3 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 962–68 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking
Proportionality] (discussing historical evidence).
4 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25–31 (2003) (plurality opinion) (uphold-
ing sentence of twenty-five years to life for recidivist convicted of shoplifting, despite its
apparent gross disproportionality to the offender’s desert, because the punishment fur-
thered the state’s interest in deterrence and incapacitation); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”).
5 See, e.g., Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, supra note 1, at 539, 567–68 (arguing
that broadly worded criminal statutes, combined with judicial abandonment of the rule of
lenity, have substantially contributed to the vast expansion of criminal law).
6 The total number of people incarcerated in American prisons and jails increased by
approximately 620% between 1970 and 2016, from 300,000 to 2,162,400. See DANIELLE
KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2016, at 2 (2018) (2016 figure); Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness,
and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 164 (2014) (1970 figure).
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How we punish.  The modern prison system is largely a nineteenth-
century invention, and it has been the subject of constant experi-
mentation—to a far greater extent than most people understand—
ever since.7  We have also experimented with involuntary steriliza-
tion and chemical castration, and have invented at least three new
methods of execution since the end of the nineteenth century.8
Our experimental criminal justice system exists in tension with the United
States Constitution, and particularly the Eighth Amendment.  Under its origi-
nal meaning, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits cruel
innovations—that is, punishments that are unjustly harsh in light of long-
standing prior practice.9  The Clause is premised on the idea that the longer
a punishment is used, and the more universally it is received, the more likely
it is to be just, reasonable, and to enjoy the consent of the people—for if it
lacked these qualities it would fall out of usage.10  On the other hand, new
punishment practices that are significantly harsher than the baseline estab-
lished by longstanding prior practice are cruel and unusual because they are
unjust in light of the traditional practices they are replacing or
supplementing.11
A punishment might be cruel and unusual because it is grossly dispro-
portionate to the offense in light of prior practice.12  For example, even skep-
tics of proportionality have accepted that a life sentence for a parking
violation would be cruel and unusual because it is far out of proportion to
the punishments traditionally given for this offense.13  A punishment might
also be cruel and unusual because it involves an inherently cruel method.
For example, the rack is cruel and unusual because the Anglo-American pun-
ishment tradition has prohibited the use of torture for centuries.14
7 See infra Part II.
8 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 198–202 (2002); DAVID GARLAND,
PECULIAR INSTITUTION 117–18 (2010); John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original
Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 556 (2014) [hereinafter Stinneford, Death,
Desuetude].
9 See infra Part I.  The idea of longstanding prior practice, or tradition, as a source of
both preconstitutional and constitutional norms that can provide stability, flexibility, and
consonance with basic principles of justice has been explored in recent years by a number
of scholars. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradi-
tion, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665; Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before
the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173; Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American
Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3349187.
10 See infra Section I.A.
11 See infra Part I.
12 See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 3, at 942.
13 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980).
14 In the Massachusetts convention for ratifying the United States Constitution, Abra-
ham Holmes argued that because the Constitution did not (before adoption of the Bill of
Rights) constrain Congress’s ability to create new punishments, it might choose to model
itself after the Spanish Inquisition and start using torture for state ends:
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Each type of experimentation listed at the beginning of this Article cre-
ates a risk of cruel and unusual punishment.  If we change what we punish by
expanding the list of crimes—and particularly by permitting punishment in
the absence of culpability—we are likely to inflict punishments that are
grossly disproportionate to an offender’s desert.15  Similarly, if legislatures
change why they punish by designing punishments solely in light of utilita-
rian goals such as deterrence or incapacitation, some of those punishments
will be grossly disproportionate to an offender’s desert.16  Innovations that
change how much we punish by lengthening the sentences of traditional
crimes are also likely to result in gross disproportionality.17  Finally, when we
change how we punish by adopting new methods of punishment, the new
methods may turn out to be inherently cruel.18
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not prohibit all new
punishments, nor does it permit all old ones.  A new punishment practice
that is not significantly harsher than the traditional practices it replaces is not
cruel and unusual.19  Similarly, an old punishment practice that falls out of
usage for multiple generations is no longer “usual,” because it has not with-
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the
consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what
kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes.  They are
nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments,
and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but
that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their
discipline.
Abraham Holmes, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention for the United States
Constitution (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 124, 125 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washing-
ton, D.C., 1836).
15 See, e.g., Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 71, 73 (1820) (holding that
slave-era statute making it a crime for “any negro . . . [to,] at any time[,] lift his or her hand
in opposition to any person not being a negro, mulatto or Indian” violated Kentucky’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments because it permitted punishment without
culpability—for example, in cases where an African American raised a hand against a white
person to ward off an assault or a rape (quoting Act of Feb. 8, 1798, ch. 63, § 13, in 2 THE
STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY 113, 116 (William Littell ed., Frankfort, Ky., Johnson & Pleas-
ants 1810))).
16 For example, theories of deterrence and incapacitation have justified sentences of
twenty-five years to life for a recidivist convicted of shoplifting golf clubs, see Ewing v. Cali-
fornia, 538 U.S. 11, 25–27, 29 (2003) (plurality opinion), and fifty years to life for a recidi-
vist convicted of two counts of shoplifting videotapes, see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
66, 76–77 (2003).
17 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 43–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the sentence Ewing
received under California’s “three strikes” law was 150% to 625% greater than the maxi-
mum sentence anyone in the country could previously have received for this crime).
18 See infra Parts II–III (discussing long-term solitary confinement); see also John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 502 (2017) [hereinafter
Stinneford, Original Meaning of Cruel] (discussing lethal injection).
19 See infra Section I.A.
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stood the test of time.20  If such a punishment is later revived, it is a new
punishment and is to be judged against the tradition as it has survived up to
today.21
In other words, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a
principle of legal development.22  Over time, some punishments fall out of
the tradition and others become part of it.  But in principle, the harshness of
the system is supposed to remain steady, so as to ensure compliance with
unchanging standards of justice and individual desert.23  Like the common
law on which it is based, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is sup-
posed to guarantee that the criminal justice system will be like the ship of the
Argonauts, replacing every board as it goes on its journeys but remaining the
same ship.24  For this process to succeed, however, we must ensure that the
20 See infra Section I.A.
21 See infra Section I.A.
22 This idea of legal development bears a certain family resemblance to interpretive
concepts of constitutional “liquidation” or “gloss.”  Liquidation is the idea, largely associ-
ated with James Madison, that if a constitutional provision is vague or ambiguous, early
interpreters (whether they be courts or the political branches of government) could settle
its meaning over time, so long as they stayed within the range of possible meaning. See
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (“Constitutional
liquidation had three key elements.  First, there had to be a textual indeterminacy.  Clear
provisions could not be liquidated, because practice could ‘expound’ the Constitution but
could not ‘alter’ it.  Second, there had to be a course of deliberate practice.  This required
repeated decisions that reflected constitutional reasoning.  Third, that course of practice
had to result in a constitutional settlement.  This settlement was marked by two related
ideas: acquiescence by the dissenting side, and ‘the public sanction’—a real or imputed
popular ratification.”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87
VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001).  Gloss is the idea, associated with Justice Frankfurter, that “a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss” on the meaning of constitu-
tional terms.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitu-
tional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 261 (2017).  The
main distinction seems to be that liquidation and gloss focus on the role of practice over
time in settling the meaning of constitutional terms, whereas the concept of “long usage”
focuses on the role of practice over time in determining the proper application of a term
whose meaning is already settled.  Further research and analysis would be required to
determine whether, and to what extent, this is a distinction with a difference.
23 See infra Section I.A.
24 See JAMES WILSON, Of the Common Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 423, 453–54
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (“It is the characteristic of a
system of common law that it be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies, and
the conveniencies of the people, by whom it is appointed.  Now, as these circumstances,
and exigencies, and conveniencies insensibly change; a proportioned change, in time and
in degree, must take place in the accommodated system.  But though the system suffer
these partial and successive alterations, yet it continues materially and substantially the
same.  The ship of the Argonauts became not another vessel, though almost every part of
her materials had been altered during the course of her voyage.” (paraphrasing MATTHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39–40 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of
Chi. Press 1971) (1713))).
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new boards are sufficiently like the old boards that they may appropriately
become part of the ship.
This Article is all about those boards.  It asks how we can determine
whether a new punishment is sufficiently similar to traditional punishments
that it may become part of our constitutional tradition, particularly when it is
difficult to compare the new punishment to traditional punishments at the
time it is adopted.25  The most difficult problem of commensurability arises
when the government introduces a new method of punishment.  If a legisla-
ture simply lengthens a sentence for a given crime, it is relatively easy to
determine whether the new punishment is grossly disproportionate to the
crime in light of prior practice.  But if the legislature replaces an old method
with a new one—for example, replacing public flogging or pillorying with a
term in prison—it is not always obvious how to compare the two methods.
This is particularly true when the new method is advertised as more “progres-
sive,” “humane,” or “scientific.”26
We can solve the commensurability problem by examining the usage of
a new punishment over time.  Usage over time reveals two types of informa-
tion that may not be apparent at the time the punishment is adopted.  First,
it shows how society responds to the punishment over time.  Some punish-
ments achieve universal reception and maintain this status over a period of
numerous generations; others do not.  Second, usage over time reveals char-
acteristics of the punishment that may not be obvious at the time of adop-
tion—particularly, the harshness of the suffering the punishment inflicts
relative to the harshness of the traditional punishments it replaced.  For
example, we have a lot more information today about the harsh effects of
long-term solitary confinement in “supermax” prisons than we did when they
were invented thirty-five years ago.  Although these two types of information
are analytically distinct, the premise of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is that they should work together in practice.27  That is, if we learn
over time that a new punishment method is significantly harsher or more
harmful than traditional punishments, this method is not likely to achieve
universal reception that remains stable over a long period of time.28
Although public opinion at any given moment may become enflamed and
thus inclined to accept cruel methods of punishment, over time the tradi-
tions of a free people will revert back toward a more just and moderate pun-
ishment practice.29
This Article will focus on two related experiments in punishment to
demonstrate how usage over time can solve the commensurability problem:
imprisonment and long-term solitary confinement.30  The modern prison
25 See infra Part I.
26 See infra Sections II.A–B.
27 See infra Section I.A.
28 See infra Section I.A.
29 See infra Section I.A.
30 I have previously argued that other innovations in punishment methods, including
three-drug lethal injection and chemical castration, are cruel and unusual.  For further
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system did not exist at the time the Constitution was ratified.31  Instead, the
most common forms of punishment were fines, corporal punishment, public
shaming of various kinds, and (relatively rarely) the death penalty.32  But in
the decades following ratification, legal reformers successfully advocated the
creation of prisons to punish offenders in place of the public spectacles that
had previously dominated the scene.33  Long-term solitary confinement was
an integral part of this reform in the early decades of the nineteenth
century.34
The grand experiment of prison creation demonstrates how usage over
time clarifies whether a new punishment practice is consistent with the Amer-
ican constitutional tradition.  Prison itself, although experimental at the out-
set, has been universally received and used for nearly two centuries.  On the
other hand, the feature of imprisonment that many considered most impor-
tant at the time it was created—long-term solitary confinement—has failed to
become part of the tradition.35  It enjoyed a vogue for several decades in the
nineteenth century but was then rejected because of its cruel effects.36  It was
adopted once more in the 1980s and its cruel effects have become apparent
once again.37  Long-term solitary confinement’s near-universal rejection
because of its harsh effects after several decades of use in the nineteenth
century is powerful evidence that it is an impermissibly cruel method of pun-
ishment.  This conclusion is bolstered by empirical evidence of the extraordi-
narily harmful effects of modern solitary confinement as compared to
imprisonment with some opportunity for meaningful human contact.38
Before starting, it is important to clarify the definition of long-term soli-
tary confinement used in this Article: extreme isolation (confinement in a
cell for twenty-two hours or more per day, without meaningful human con-
tact) for an extended duration (a period of three months or more).39  This
discussion of these issues, see John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical
Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559
(2006); Stinneford, Original Meaning of Cruel, supra note 18, at 502.
31 See infra Section II.A.
32 See infra Section II.A.
33 See infra Section II.A.
34 See infra Section II.A.
35 See infra Section II.G.
36 See infra Section II.B.
37 See infra Section II.D.
38 See infra Part III; see also Merin Cherian, Note, Cruel, Unusual, and Unconstitutional:
An Originalist Argument for Ending Long-Term Solitary Confinement, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1759
(2019).
39 The choice of a three-month period is somewhat arbitrary.  The Supreme Court
found in In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890), that two to four weeks of solitary confinement
prior to execution added such “terror” and “severity” to the sentence that it constituted a
punishment subject to constitutional limits. See infra notes 192–207 and accompanying
text.  Similarly, the ABA draws the line between shorter-term and long-term solitary con-
finement at thirty days. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS 12 (3d ed. 2010).  The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on torture, on
the other hand, has called for a ban on solitary confinement in excess of fifteen days. See
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definition distinguishes long-term solitary confinement from two distinct
practices that are sometimes given the same name: (1) assignment to solitary
cells with significant out-of-cell time involving interaction with other people;
and (2) shorter-term isolation as discipline for breaking prison rules.  Each
practice has been a part of the American prison system (albeit sometimes an
underground part) from the beginning, and each presents its own questions
of cruelty40—but both are distinct from the long-term solitary confinement
discussed in this Article, whose harshness comes from the sheer duration and
totality of the prisoner’s isolation.41
Part I of this Article sets forth the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, with a particular focus on the ways in which
usage over time can clarify both the degree of stable societal acceptance the
punishment has achieved and the objective harshness of the punishment in
comparison to traditional practices.  Parts II and III use the examples of
imprisonment and long-term solitary confinement to demonstrate the dual
function of usage over time.  Part II focuses on the development of stable,
multigenerational societal consensus.  It describes the history of long-term
solitary confinement in the United States in the context of the overall history
of the prison, demonstrating that although the prison has achieved universal
reception over a period of nearly two centuries, long-term solitary confine-
ment has not.  Rather, it is a repeated, failed experiment in punishment.
Part III focuses on what usage over time has shown us about the harshness of
long-term solitary confinement as compared to imprisonment with some
meaningful opportunity for human interaction.  This section examines the
empirical literature surrounding imprisonment and long-term solitary con-
finement, which shows long-term solitary confinement to be a “cruel” prac-
tice within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  Part IV provides a
conclusion and suggests the implications of the foregoing analysis.  The most
important implication may be not only that long-term solitary confinement
should be eliminated, but that reduction of the prison overcrowding that
gave rise to the perceived need for such confinement should be a legislative
priority of the highest order.
Solitary Confinement Should Be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says, UN NEWS (Oct. 18,
2011), http://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/392012-solitary-confinement-should-be-
banned-most-cases-un-expert-says.  I have chosen a three-month period simply because it
enables me to draw a clear distinction between what might arguably be constitutional and
practices that significantly—cruelly—exceed what has traditionally been considered
acceptable.  Further research into the historical practice and psychological effects of
shorter-term solitary confinement might show that the line between shorter-term and long-
term solitary confinement should be drawn earlier in the period of solitary confinement.
Indeed, because so much of the practice of shorter-term solitary confinement has been
hidden from public view and from the view of the courts, it may be the case that there is no
clear constitutionally acceptable tradition of even shorter-term solitary confinement.  But
this difficult topic is for another day.
40 See infra Section II.C.
41 See infra Part III.
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I. ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF USAGE OVER TIME
Although the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” is a familiar one,
its meaning is surprisingly obscure to modern readers.  The word “unusual”
seems particularly out of place, as there does not seem to be any clear con-
nection between a punishment’s rarity and its cruelty.42  A law mandating the
public torture of all sex offenders, for example, seems crueler than a law
mandating torture only on rare occasions involving the worst offenders.  For
this reason, courts and scholars have largely ignored the word or assigned it a
weak meaning.43  Similarly, the Supreme Court has tended to treat the word
“cruel” as covering only those punishments motivated by cruel intent44
(sometimes rephrased as “deliberate indifference”).45  As I have shown in
prior articles, and as is summarized below, the Court’s reading of both terms
is incorrect.  In fact, the word “unusual” means “contrary to long usage,”46
and the word “cruel” means “unjustly harsh.”47  A punishment is cruel and
unusual if it is unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice.
A. The Original Meaning of Unusual
The word “unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is a
term of art that comes from the common law.48  Although today the com-
mon law is often thought of as judge-made law, it was traditionally described
as the law of “custom” and “long usage.”  The basic idea was that a practice or
custom could attain the status of law if it enjoyed universal reception
throughout the jurisdiction for a very long time.49  These two characteris-
42 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975–76 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
43 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality opinion) (treating
the word as having no meaning or as meaning “different from that which is generally
done”); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (same); see also, e.g., RAOUL BER-
GER, DEATH PENALTIES 41 (1982) (same); Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122 (2004) (“immorally discriminatory”);
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (“constitutional ‘boilerplate’”); Michael J. Perry, Is Capi-
tal Punishment Unconstitutional? And Even If We Think It Is, Should We Want the Supreme Court
to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV. 867, 880 (2007) (“[n]ot common” or “rare” (quoting 2 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 503 (London, 6th ed. 1785))).
44 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (plurality opinion) (risk of botched
execution not sufficiently substantial to “suggest cruelty”); id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (“[I]n my view, a method of execution violates the Eighth Amend-
ment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain . . . .”).
45 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
46 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1825 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Origi-
nal Meaning of Unusual].
47 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Cruel, supra note 18, at 506.
48 See generally Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 46, at 1745.
49 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67 (“[I]n our law the goodness of a
custom depends upon it’s [sic] having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of
our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.”); EDWARD
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tics—universality and long usage—justified legal enforcement of the practice
despite the fact that it was never ordered by the sovereign, because these
characteristics were thought to guarantee its goodness, practicality, and con-
sensual nature.50  If the practice was not good, it was thought, it would fall
out of usage.51  Thus the theoretical basis for common-law judging was not
that judges had the power to make law, but that they had the power to iden-
tify and enforce universal, longstanding customs.52
Long usage as a basis for law gave rise to the idea of rights enforceable
against the sovereign.53  Common-law thinkers asserted that unwritten laws
that enjoy long usage are morally and practically superior to laws ordered by
COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), reprinted in 2
THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 577, 701 (Steve Sheppard ed.,
2003) (“And note that no custome is to bee allowed, but such custome as hath bin used by
title of prescription, that is to say, from time out of minde.”); WILSON, supra note 24, at
435–36 (“[L]ong customs, approved by the consent of those who use them, acquire the
qualities of a law.” (quoting Justinian)).
50 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *64, *70, *74 (asserting that the only cus-
toms that had “binding power, and the force of laws” were those that enjoyed “long and
immemorial usage” and “universal reception throughout the kingdom”; that such qualities
made the common law “the perfection of reason . . . it always intends to conform thereto,
and . . . what is not reason is not law”; and that the common law was consistent with
“English liberty” because it arose through “the voluntary consent of the people”); JOHN
DAVIES, A Preface Dedicatory, in LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES & MATTERS EN LEY RESOLUES &
ADIUDGES EN LES COURTS DEL ROY EN IRELAND *2 (Dublin, 1615) (“And this Customary lawe is
the most perfect, & most excellent, and without comparison the best, to make & preserue a
commonwealth, for the written lawes which are made either by the edicts of Princes, or by
Counselles of estate, are imposed vppon the subiect before any Triall or Probation made,
whether the same bee fitt & agreeable to the nature & disposition of the people, or
whether they will breed any inconvenience or no.  But a Custome doth neuer become a lawe
to binde the people, vntill it hath bin tried & approued time out of minde, during all
which time there did thereby arise no inconuenience . . . .”).
51 See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630), reprinted in 2 THE
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 49, at 563, 564 (“Cus-
tome . . . lose[s its] being, if usage faile.”); DAVIES, supra note 50, at *2 (“[F]or if it had
beene found inconuenient at any time, it had beene vsed no longer, but had beene inter-
rupted, & conseqnently it had lost the vertue & force of a lawe.”).
52 Because the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause draws its meaning from the
common law, it is useful to look at the ways in which courts and tribunals treat the meaning
of the phrase “cruel and unusual” in common-law contexts outside of criminal law. See
generally, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners,
and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817 (2016) (examining the meaning of
“cruel and unusual” in the context of slavery).
53 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 46, at 1778 (summarizing
rights identified by Edward Coke as derivative from the common law); id. at 1781–86
(describing seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conflicts in England between those who
contended that the sovereign possessed absolute power and those who contended that the
sovereign’s power was limited by common-law rights); id. at 1792–800 (describing how the
idea that the power of the sovereign was limited by common-law rights was the ideological
basis for the American Revolution); id. at 1800–10 (describing how the same idea led to
adoption of the Bill of Rights).
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king or parliament.54  Customs do not become law until multiple generations
have used them and found them to be workable and just.55  Laws ordered by
the sovereign, by contrast, become law before they have been used and may
turn out to be unjust or unworkable in practice.56  A growing chorus in
England and America argued that the sovereign lacked legitimate authority
to enact or enforce laws that violate rights established through long usage—
particularly rights relating to life, liberty, or property.57  This complaint was
the basis of the American Revolution and was the core argument used by
Antifederalists agitating for a Bill of Rights.58
The word “unusual” was part of the lexicon of rights used in the debates
surrounding the American Revolution and the subsequent ratification of the
United States Constitution.59  To say that something was unusual was to say
that it was new and that it violated rights established through long usage.60
In the context of constitutional debates, the word “unusual” is a “thick ethical
concept[ ].”61  It both describes a specific factual condition—“newness,” or
more specifically, “newness that runs contrary to longstanding common-law
rights”—and gives reasons to avoid that factual condition.  Because rights
established through long usage were considered presumptively just and rea-
sonable, new governmental practices that ran contrary to such rights were
presumptively unjust and unreasonable.62  Repeatedly throughout the
period of the American Revolution, and again during the ratification of the
United States Constitution, critics of governmental action that violated long-
standing common-law practice would condemn such action by describing it
as “unusual,” or “unconstitutional,” or as an “innovation.”63  These terms
were used interchangeably.
The common-law notion of long usage contains a principle of legal
development over time.  If a once-traditional practice falls out of usage for
multiple generations, it loses its status as presumptively reasonable.64  If
revived, it is to be treated as a new practice and compared to the tradition
54 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *70 (arguing that when a common-law rule
is abandoned for a new rule, “the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared from the
inconveniences that have followed the innovation”); DAVIES, supra note 50, at 4; cf. COKE,
supra note 49, at 740 (“[W]hen any innovation or new invention starts up, . . . trie it with
the Rules of the common Law, . . . for these be true Touchstones to sever the pure gold
from the drosse and sophistications of novelties and new inventions.  And by this example
you may perceive, That the rule of the old common Law being soundly . . . applied to such
novelties, it doth utterly crush them and bring them to nothing . . . .”).
55 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *67
56 See id.
57 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 46, at 1768–810.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 1770 & nn.175–84, 1771 & nn.185–89.
61 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140 (1985).
62 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 46, at 1799–800.
63 See id.
64 See generally Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, supra note 8 (discussing the common-law
doctrine of desuetude incorporated in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
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that has developed up to that time.65  Similarly, before a new practice can be
considered “usual,” it must gain universal reception within the relevant legal
community, and it must sustain such universal reception over a period of
multiple generations.66  Only at that point can the practice be considered
firmly part of the tradition, for only then can it be said to enjoy the mul-
tigenerational consent of the whole people.67
The precise amount of time a practice must enjoy universal reception
before becoming part of the tradition is not clearly and consistently defined
by common-law writers.  For example, Blackstone wrote that a practice must
have been used universally from time “immemorial” to be considered part of
the common law.68  If anyone could determine a time when the practice was
not used, it could not be part of the common law.69  At the same time, how-
ever, Blackstone acknowledged the fact that the English common law had
developed over time and had changed as an “intermixture of adventitious
nations, the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans . . .
must have insensibly introduced and incorporated many of their own cus-
toms with those that were before established.”70  American common-law
thinkers such as James Wilson rejected the idea that a practice had to enjoy
“immemorial usage” before becoming part of the common law:
Some writers, when they describe that usage, which is the foundation of
common law, characterize it by the epithet immemorial.  The parliamentary
description is not so strong.  “Long use and custom” is assigned as the crite-
rion of law, “taken by the people at their free liberty, and by their own con-
sent.”  And this criterion is surely sufficient to satisfy the principle: for
consent is certainly proved by long, though it be not immemorial usage.71
Despite this lack of precision, there are some things we can say with cer-
tainty about the scope and duration of usage a practice must enjoy before we
can say that it is clearly part of the tradition.  First, reception of the practice
must be universal; that is, it must be employed throughout the relevant legal
community.72  Second, the practice must be public.  A secret or “under-
ground” governmental practice cannot be said to enjoy the consent of the
people “taken . . . at their free liberty.”73  Third, the practice must continue
65 See id. at 538–39.
66 See id. at 538–39, 561–62.
67 See id.
68 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *64.
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 See JAMES WILSON, Municipal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 24,
at 159, 186.
72 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *64 (“I therefore stile these parts of our law
leges non scriptæ, because their original institution and authority are not set down in writing,
as acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by
long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom.”);
73 See WILSON, supra note 71, at 186; see also 1 BLACKSTONE at *73 (describing the
common law as “general immemorial custom . . . from time to time declared in the deci-
sions of the courts of justice; which decisions are preserved among our public records,
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to be universally received over the course of multiple generations.  The pre-
mise of the common law is that multigenerational consensus is more reliably
just and reasonable than the consensus of a given moment.74  As noted
above, the number of generations that must receive a given practice before it
can be said to enjoy long usage is uncertain.  Cases concerning the reverse
question—how much time it takes a once-traditional practice to fall out of
usage for constitutional purposes—have generally required a century or
more of disuse.75  Similarly, it would seem that a century or more of universal
reception would be required to show that a new practice enjoys a stable mul-
tigenerational consensus.  But in any event, there is no reason to treat long
usage as an “on-off” switch.  However much time it may take definitively to
establish “long usage,” we can at least say that the longer and more univer-
sally a public governmental practice is received, the more likely it is to com-
port with the tradition.
B. The Original Meaning of Cruel
The historical evidence shows that in the context of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the word “cruel” means “unjustly harsh,” not “motivated by cruel
intent.”76  At least some of the unintended effects of a punishment may be
considered in determining whether it is cruel and unusual.77
The historical evidence also indicates that a new punishment practice
that creates a greater risk of unjustified suffering than the baseline risk per-
mitted by longstanding prior practice may be considered cruel and unusual.
For example, in 1799, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that it
was cruel and unusual to impose a joint fine in a criminal case because it
violated a longstanding common-law rule designed to protect against the risk
of disproportionate punishment.78  The problem with joint fines was that if
one codefendant defaulted, the remaining codefendants would be required
to pay the defaulter’s share of the fine, or go to jail if they were unable to do
so.79  Thus, even prior to any default, the joint fine was cruel and unusual
because it imposed a risk of unjust suffering that was greater than the com-
mon law would allow.80  On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Wyatt, the
General Court of Virginia upheld a statute that gave judges the discretion to
explained in our reports, and digested for general use in the authoritative writings of the
venerable sages of the law”).
74 See, e.g., COKE, supra note 49, at 701 (“[I]f all the reason that is dispersed into so
many severall heads were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of
England is, because by many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an
infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience growne to such a
perfection, for the government of this Realme . . . .”)
75 See Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, supra note 8, at 593–94.
76 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Cruel, supra note 18, at 441.
77 See id. at 501.
78 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (1 Call) 555, 557, 559–60 (1799).
79 See id. at 558.
80 See id. at 558–59.
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order that a defendant convicted of illegal gaming be flogged on one or sev-
eral occasions over a six-month period, so long as he was not given more than
thirty-nine stripes at a time.81  Wyatt argued that this created the risk that a
judge would order the defendant to be flogged every day for six months,
which would result in “death produced by the most cruel torture.”82  The court
acknowledged this risk, but noted that judges are required to exercise discre-
tion within the bounds set by longstanding common-law practice.83  If the
judge ordered flogging that exceeded these bounds, “he might and would be
impeached.”84  Because the risk created by this statute was consistent with the
risk permitted by longstanding prior practice, it did not violate the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights.85  These cases
imply that new punishment methods such as lethal injection may be cruel
and unusual, because they create a far greater risk of excruciatingly painful
botched executions than traditional methods like hanging.86  Similarly, long-
term solitary confinement may be cruel and unusual if it significantly height-
ens the risk of extreme suffering as compared to traditional modes of con-
finement that offer the opportunity for meaningful interaction with others.87
C. The Significance of Usage over Time
As discussed above, a punishment violates the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause if it is unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice.
Sometimes the cruelty of the punishment in comparison to traditional prac-
tices is immediately apparent.  If a legislature brought back the rack or
thumbscrews as a method of punishment, or imposed the death penalty for
shoplifting, a court could appropriately strike it down the moment it is
adopted.  But often the relationship of the new punishment to the traditional
practice is not immediately apparent, particularly when it is publicly
presented as more “progressive,” “scientific,” or “humane” than the tradi-
tional punishment it replaces.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, long-term solitary confinement was instituted on the ground that it
was a more humane and effective means of reforming criminals than the
public corporal punishments it replaced.88  At the beginning of the twentieth
century, social progressives introduced involuntary sterilization as a humane
and scientific way to prevent the propagation of “socially unfit” persons and
81 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694, 698, 701 (1828).
82 Id. at 700.
83 Id. at 701.
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Cruel, supra note 18, at 502 (arguing that lethal
injection is likely unconstitutional because studies show that it doubles the risk of excruci-
atingly painful botched executions as compared to traditional methods of execution like
hanging); see also AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES 177 (2014) (compiling data on
botched executions).
87 See infra Parts II–III.
88 See infra Section II.A.
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thus reduce crime and poverty.89  Throughout the twentieth century, the
government repeatedly replaced prevailing methods of execution with others
(electrocution, then the gas chamber, then lethal injection) advertised as
more “scientific” and “humane.”  Such experimental punishments initially
achieved high degrees of acceptance in courts of law and/or in courts of
public opinion, but later came to be questioned and often rejected as their
effects became known.90
This process is consistent with the core idea underlying the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, which is that long usage is the most reliable
means of determining whether a governmental practice is just, reasonable,
and enjoys the stable, multigenerational consent of the people.  In order to
understand the significance of this idea, we must consider the alternative
methods available for determining whether a punishment is unconstitution-
ally cruel.
One alternative would be to take a snapshot of current public opinion.91
This is the most democratic means of measuring the constitutionality of a
punishment.  If the sovereign people approve the punishment, it must be
constitutional.  But this approach is inconsistent with the premise underlying
a written Bill of Rights, which is that the Constitution should constrain what
is sometimes called the “tyranny of the majority.”  When caught in a moral
panic—concerning drug dealers, juvenile superpredators, or sex offenders,
for example—public opinion is likely to support extreme punishments in
order to restore a sense of social control.  The Constitution is meant to con-
strain the tendency to excess, not facilitate it.
Another alternative would be to allow judges to engage in abstract moral
reasoning to determine whether a punishment is impermissibly cruel.92
Under this approach, if five members of the Supreme Court determine that a
punishment violates some abstract notion of cruelty, it is unconstitutional.
But a moment’s reflection shows the inadequacy of this method.  Abstract
principles are notoriously difficult to translate into concrete practice in a
manner that most people would consider reliable.  Some people consider it
cruel to execute those who rape children, for example, while others consider
89 See e.g., Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, supra note 8, at 556.
90 See BANNER, supra note 8, at 198–202; GARLAND, supra note 8, at 117–18.
91 This approach roughly corresponds to the “evolving standards of decency” test that
has dominated much of the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
92 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The beginning point is a
review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of
legislatures that have addressed the question. . . . We then must determine, in the exercise
of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate pun-
ishment for juveniles.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (“[I]n cases involving
a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1997) (plurality opinion)).
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it morally justified.93  What method can the Court use to reliably choose
between these viewpoints?  Justices are members of the society in which they
live and are just as likely to share the passions and prejudices of the moment
as anyone else.  Unless we are willing to accept the idea that judges have
unconstrained authority to impose their own private moral views on the rest
of society, this method is also unacceptable.
The idea of long usage includes both a commitment to democratic con-
sensus and to abstract principles of justice but adds to the reliability of both
by focusing on usage over time.  The longer a practice is used, and the more
universally it is received, the more likely it is both to enjoy the stable, mul-
tigenerational consent of the people and to comport with fundamental prin-
ciples of justice.  This is so because usage over time reveals two things.  First,
it reveals the presence or absence of a multigenerational consensus in favor
of the punishment.94  Second, usage over time reveals the effects of the new
punishment more clearly, enabling us to compare it more reliably to the
traditional punishment it has replaced.95  Although these two types of infor-
mation are conceptually distinct from each other, the Eighth Amendment
contemplates that they will work together in practice.  If usage over time
reveals that the punishments’ effects are significantly harsher than the tradi-
tion would permit, we can expect that it will fail to achieve a stable, mul-
tigenerational consensus in its favor.
Parts II and III below apply these principles to the twin experiments of
imprisonment and long-term solitary confinement.  Part II shows that while
imprisonment has come to be universally received within the United States
for nearly two centuries, long-term solitary confinement was largely rejected
on grounds of cruelty after several decades of popularity in the nineteenth
century.  It never became a “usual” punishment, but rather has the character-
istics of a failed experiment.  Part III examines what usage over time has
shown us about the effects of modern long-term solitary imprisonment in
comparison to imprisonment with some opportunity for meaningful human
contact.  This review of the empirical literature is consistent with the nine-
teenth-century conclusion that long-term solitary confinement is an imper-
missibly cruel method of punishment.
II. USAGE OVER TIME: THE HISTORY OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Imprisonment was first introduced as a primary form of punishment in
this country at the end of the eighteenth century.96  One of the most impor-
tant features of imprisonment, for many offenders, was long-term solitary
confinement.97  Reformers hoped that imprisonment and solitary confine-
93 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (striking down law permitting execu-
tion for the crime of aggravated rape of a child despite evidence of divided public opinion
concerning the punishment).
94 See infra Part II.
95 See infra Part III.
96 See infra Section II.A.
97 See infra Section II.A.
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ment would be less degrading and more effective at rehabilitating offenders
and deterring crime than the previously dominant system of fines, corporal
punishment, shaming punishments, and execution.98  Over the course of the
nineteenth century, prison achieved universal reception as corporal and
shaming punishments fell away.99  But long-term solitary confinement, after
an initial phase of popularity, came to be rejected by the 1860s because of its
cruel effects.100  It survived at the very margins of penal practice during the
twentieth century before being revived in the form of the “supermax” move-
ment in the 1980s and 1990s.101  Today it appears to be gradually receding
once again as its cruel effects become more widely known.102  Whereas
prison has been transformed from an experimental punishment to what
appears to be a “usual” punishment, long-term solitary confinement looks
more like a repeated, failed experiment.  It has never become “usual.”
A. Reform and Conservation in the Founding Period
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a period of
great intellectual ferment in America.103  Much of this ferment related to the
protection of individuals exposed to the threat of criminal punishment.104
Punishment is the most coercive thing the government does short of war, and
Americans perceived that the British had abused this power in two primary
ways: by ignoring the longstanding common-law rights of Americans subject
to investigation, prosecution, and punishment;105 and by radically expanding
the list of capital offenses in England from nine to over one hundred sixty.106
98 See infra Section II.A.
99 See infra Sections II.A–B.
100 See infra Section II.B.
101 See infra Sections II.C–D.
102 See infra Section II.F.
103 See generally, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1787 (1969); Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitu-
tional Law (pts. 1–2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928–1929), reprinted in EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell
Univ. Press, 12th prtg. 1984); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Funda-
mental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
104 See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195 (2009); Deborah A.
Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Histori-
cal Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV.
783, 813–23 (1975).
105 See Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 46, at 1796–97 (describing
American complaints about British efforts to undermine the right to trial by jury in the
vicinage of the offense).
106 See Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 572 (2018)
(“[N]ine specific crimes were traditionally classified as felonies at common law—murder,
manslaughter, rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, arson, mayhem, and larceny.”); 4 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 49, at *18 (“It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions
which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty have been
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To prevent these abuses in the new American republic, legislators engaged in
a project of conservation and reform.
Conservation primarily showed itself in the rhetoric of the American
Revolution and in the drafting of state and federal constitutions that fol-
lowed.  Americans were steeped in the English constitutional writings of
Coke and Blackstone, and justified their break from England on the ground
that the British refused to respect their longstanding common-law rights.107
After breaking from England, state and federal constitution drafters wrote
many of these common-law rights into the constitutional texts so that the new
American governments could not ignore them.108  One of these common-law
rights was the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.109
At the same time, many Americans were familiar with the writings of
criminal justice reformers such as Montesquieu and Beccaria, who advocated
greater proportionality in punishment and reduction or elimination of the
death penalty.110  The influence of Beccaria can be seen in several early state
constitutions that not only prohibited cruel and unusual punishments but
also called for greater proportionality in punishment and the reduction or
elimination of “sanguinary laws.”111
declared by act of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to
be worthy of instant death.” (footnote omitted)).
107 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 103, at 10 (noting that Americans’ focus on the English
legal tradition was “what made their Revolution seem so unusual, for they revolted not
against the English constitution but on behalf of it”); Grey, supra note 103.
108 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157–60 (2001).
109 See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Elbridge Gerry (Sept. 29, 1787), in 24
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 451, 451–52 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1996)
(arguing that the proposed federal constitution should be amended to include a number
of common-law rights, including the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments).
110 See Bessler, supra note 104, at 196; see also Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 104, at
813–23.
111 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. I, § XVIII (“All penalties ought to be propor-
tioned to the nature of the offence.  No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to
the crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason;
where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offences, the people are led
to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant
with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest dye.  For the same reason a
multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust.  The true design of all punish-
ments being to reform, not to exterminate mankind.”); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII,
§ 14 (“All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.  No wise legislature
will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do to
those of murder and treason.  When the same undistinguished severity is exerted against
all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and
to commit the most flagrant, with as little compunction as they do the slightest offenses.
For the same reasons, a multitude of sanguinary laws are both impolitic and unjust: the
true design of all punishment being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind.”); PA. CONST.
of 1776, ch. II, § 38 (directing that “[t]he penal laws as heretofore used, shall be reformed
. . . , and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more propor-
tionate to the crimes”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XL (same).
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The impulse for reform showed itself in three primary areas: first, a
movement to reduce or eliminate the death penalty; second, a growing rejec-
tion of corporal punishments like flogging, especially in the northern states;
and third, a revulsion against public shaming as a method of punishment.
The movement to reduce or eliminate the death penalty had many advo-
cates in the founding era.  Blackstone had complained in his highly influen-
tial Commentaries on the Laws of England that the numerous capital offenses
authorized under the English Bloody Code were manifestly unjust.112
Although there were fewer capital offenses in America than England, many
American writers also advocated reducing the scope of the death penalty or
even eliminating it.  For example, Thomas Jefferson drafted an idiosyncratic
proposal for proportioning punishments in Virginia that would have permit-
ted the death penalty only for murder and treason and imposed a strangely
literal form of lex talionis for many other crimes (maiming for those who
maim; castration for those who rape; etc.).113  Benjamin Rush argued that
the death penalty was associated with tyranny and was inconsistent with
republican principles.114  Edward Livingston argued that public executions
were an unhealthy spectacle that fostered an appetite for death.115  During
this period, many states amended their statutes to limit the scope of the
death penalty.116  For example, Pennsylvania—which was at the forefront of
virtually every aspect of the criminal reform movement—eliminated the
death penalty in 1790 for robbery, burglary, and sodomy, and further
reduced the scope of the death penalty in 1794 by subdividing murder into
“degrees” and only permitting the death penalty for first-degree murder.117
The criminal justice reform movement also increasingly rejected the use
of flogging and other forms of corporal punishment, particularly in northern
states.118  For a variety of reasons, Americans started to feel a “revulsion
against bodily punishments.”119  Massachusetts eliminated flogging as a form
of punishment in its legislature’s 1804–1805 session.120  Indiana eliminated
flogging in 1821, at the same time it opened its state prison.121  Although
corporal punishment did not disappear immediately, its use declined over
112 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 17.
113 See Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Hereto-
fore Capital, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 492, 492–504 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
114 See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION 65 (1989).
115 See 1 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMI-
NAL JURISPRUDENCE 43 (New York, Nat’l Prison Ass’n 1873).
116 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73
(1993).
117 See id.
118 See MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 10–11 (1984); see
also BANNER, supra note 8, at 88–111.
119 FRIEDMAN, supra note 116, at 74.
120 See id.
121 See id.
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the course of the nineteenth century.122  Its decline was closely associated
with the rise of the prison.123
Finally, public shaming fell out of favor during this period,124 as it came
to be seen as degrading, uncivilized, and ineffective.  Professor Lawrence
Friedman has noted that pre-Revolutionary colonial governments made
heavy use of shaming punishments in the hope that the sharp, sudden pain
of public humiliation would convince those who committed crimes to change
their ways.125  Such punishments included the stocks, the pillory, and the
ducking stool.126  But the growth and increasingly mobile nature of the
American population arguably made shaming punishments less effective; for
after being shamed, the offender could simply move to a new locale where
his identity was unknown.127
The extent to which corporal and shaming methods of punishment were
repudiated in the early nineteenth century is demonstrated by a case decided
in 1825 by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, James v. Commonwealth.128  In
that case, the defendant was convicted of the crime of being a “common
scold” and was sentenced to be publicly “duck[ed]” in cold water three
times.129  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that this punishment was
not authorized, either because it had never been part of the common law of
Pennsylvania,130 or because it had fallen into desuetude,131 or because it had
been implicitly repealed by the penal code of 1790.132  The purpose of the
new penal code was the “abolition of all infamous, disgraceful, public punish-
ments—all cruel and unnatural punishments—for all the classes of minor
offences and misdemeanors, to which they had been before applied.”133  In
reaching this decision, the court condemned the idea of punishing “scolds”
because it was discriminatory against the poor, the aged, and women.134  But
it also appeared to go further and condemn any and all uses of public
shaming:
If the reformation of the culprit, and prevention of the crime, be the just
foundation and object of all punishments, nothing could be further
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 75.
125 See id. at 37.
126 See id. at 37–38.
127 See id. at 12–13.  The growth and mobility of the American population cannot com-
pletely explain the rejection of shaming and corporal punishments, for American govern-
ments employed methods like branding and bodily mutilation as ways of “marking” certain
offenders as criminals, precisely to prevent them from slipping off to a new location and
adopting a new identity. See id. at 40.
128 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825).
129 Id. at 220–21, 225.
130 Id. at 231.
131 Id. at 228.
132 Id. at 224, 231.
133 Id. at 231.
134 Id. at 226, 230, 236.
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removed from these salutary ends, than the infliction in question.  It
destroys all personal respect; the women thus punished would scold on for
life, and the exhibition would be far from being beneficial to the
spectators.135
This last passage reflects the essence of the critique of public shaming: it
was considered degrading—it “destroy[ed] all personal respect” for the
offender; it was considered ineffective—the offender would “scold on for
life”; and it coarsened public sensibilities, and was thus “far from being bene-
ficial to the spectators.”136
B. Nineteenth-Century Imprisonment and Long-Term Solitary Confinement
The decline of shaming and corporal punishments was closely associated
with the rise of a new method of punishment: the prison.137  Prior to the
nineteenth century, jails were primarily used to house debtors, pretrial
defendants, and convicts awaiting corporal punishment or execution.138  On
the relatively rare occasion when a jail sentence was imposed as punishment,
the term “rarely exceeded three months and often proved as fleeting as
twenty-four hours.”139  Prisoners in eighteenth-century jails were kept
together in large rooms, creating risk of disease and violence, and giving rise
to the criticism that they were schools for vice.140
Several intellectual movements converged in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries to support incarceration, and particularly solitary
confinement, as a new form of punishment preferable to corporal or sham-
ing punishments.  English evangelical philanthropists argued that the com-
mission of a crime showed that the criminal was estranged from God.141
Instead of being fined or publicly shamed, therefore, criminal offenders
should be separated from society and given time alone to reflect, pray, and
bring their souls back into alignment with God and their fellow citizens.142
Secular reformers argued that crime arose from an offender’s bad associa-
tions with other criminals, and that punishment should be designed to keep
offenders from “contaminating” each other and making reformation more
135 Id. at 235.
136 Id.
137 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 116, at 74; ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITEN-
TIARY, at xi (1992).
138 See Ashley T. Rubin & Keramet Reiter, Continuity in the Face of Penal Innovation: Revi-
siting the History of American Solitary Confinement, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1604, 1612–13
(2018).
139 HIRSCH, supra note 137, at 8.
140 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1613–14.
141 See HIRSCH, supra note 137, at 19.
142 See id.
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difficult.143  Still others argued that solitary confinement would deter crime
because it would fill potential offenders with “terror.”144
The first prisons were built in the 1790s.145  Initially, solitary confine-
ment was not a dominant feature of incarceration.  Pennsylvania’s Walnut
Street Prison, which was built to house one hundred prisoners, contained
only sixteen solitary cells and these were used in a relatively limited fash-
ion.146  But over time, prison reformers started turning more completely
toward the idea of solitary confinement of large numbers of prisoners in
order to foster rehabilitation and ensure order in prison.147
In 1821, New York engaged in a major experiment in systematic long-
term solitary confinement at its Auburn State Prison.148  The state legislature
passed an act authorizing prison inspectors to “select a class of convicts to be
composed of the oldest and most heinous offenders, and to confine them
constantly in solitary cells” in the hope that these offenders would be
reformed.149  The result of this experiment was devastating.  In their famous
study of the American penitentiary system, Beaumont and Tocqueville
described the Auburn experiment as follows:
This trial, from which so happy a result had been anticipated, was fatal to the
greater part of the convicts: in order to reform them, they had been submit-
ted to complete isolation; but this absolute solitude, if nothing interrupt[s]
it, is beyond the strength of man; it destroys the criminal without intermis-
sion and without pity; it does not reform, it kills.
The unfortunates, on whom this experiment was made, fell into a state
of depression, so manifest, that their keepers were struck with it; their lives
seemed in danger, if they remained longer in this situation; five of them,
had already succumbed during a single year; their moral state was not less
alarming; one of them had become insane; another, in a fit of despair, had
embraced the opportunity when the keeper brought him something, to pre-
143 See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analy-
sis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 482 (1997)
(“The individualism of the age underscored the hope that criminals could be compelled to
change internally, especially when kept isolated from each other and from the influence of
the outside social world.”); see also HIRSCH, supra note 137, at 22 (“Incarceration became
the key to rational rehabilitation because it removed criminals from their corrupting envi-
ronment long enough to administer corrective therapy.”).
144 2 WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 291 (7th ed.,
London, J. Davis 1790); see also HIRSCH, supra note 137, at 21 (describing more broadly the
theories of deterrence).
145 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1612.
146 See id. at 1613.
147 See id. at 1613–17.
148 See id. at 1614.
149 GERSHOM POWERS, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTRUCTION, MANAGEMENT, AND DIS-
CIPLINE &C. &C. OF THE NEW-YORK STATE PRISON AT AUBURN 32 (Auburn, N.Y., U.F.
Doubleday 1826).
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cipitate himself from his cell, running the almost certain chance of a mortal
fall.150
The results of this initial experiment were so dire that New York dropped it
after less than two years and gave most of the prisoners pardons.151  Auburn
State Prison then adopted a new plan under which prisoners still slept alone
in their cells and were still required to maintain silence, but were required to
work in “common workshops” with other prisoners during the day.152  This
change apparently alleviated the drastic consequences of total isolation.153
Problems similar to those that occurred at Auburn also arose several
years later in Pennsylvania’s Western State Penitentiary,154 which had also
attempted total isolation of prisoners.  Prisoners quickly fell into poor health
and had to be released from their cells.155
Pennsylvania was undeterred.  In 1829 it opened the Eastern State Peni-
tentiary at Cherry Hill to hold large numbers of prisoners in solitary confine-
ment.156  The new prison was designed to avoid past mistakes: The cells were
larger and better ventilated than those at Western State Penitentiary.157
Each cell had a small adjoining yard into which the offender would periodi-
cally be released in order to enjoy some sunshine.158  Prisoners were given in-
cell work to keep their minds occupied and weekly visits from prison staff and
other approved visitors.159
Despite these improvements, the fact remained that prisoners at Cherry
Hill lived in almost total isolation.160  They spent most of their time in their
cells, where they worked, ate, and slept alone.161  Communication between
prisoners was forbidden and all prisoners were required to maintain a rule of
silence.162  They were only allowed to see visitors approved by prison officials,
and were given little reading material other than the Bible.163  As Peter
Scharff Smith describes, “[t]he inmate was expected to turn his thoughts
150 G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 5 (Francis Lieber trans., Philadelphia, Carey, Lea &
Blanchard 1833) (citations omitted); see also POWERS, supra note 149, at 36 (noting that
one prisoner was “so desperate, that he sprang from his cell, when his door was opened,
and threw himself from the fourth gallery, upon the pavement,” and that another “beat
and mangled his head against the walls of his cell, until he destroyed one of his eyes”).
151 See POWERS, supra note 149, at 36.
152 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1615–17.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 1614.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 1615.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 1615–16.
160 See HIRSCH, supra note 137, at 25 (noting that Pennsylvania’s system of isolating
prisoners from each other was designed “to prevent their mutual corruption”).
161 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 116, at 79.
162 See id.
163 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1618 n.5.
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inward, to meet God, to repent his crimes, and eventually to return to society
as a morally cleansed Christian citizen . . . .”164
Pennsylvania officials claimed that their system was more humane than
the reformed Auburn system of congregate labor,165 but by the late 1830s,
reports started surfacing that the system was causing “hallucinating prisoners,
‘dementia,’ and ‘monomania.’”166  An 1846 report noted a “disproportion-
ately high number of cases of mental illness in Philadelphia’s Cherry Hill
Prison,”167 but attempted to attribute these symptoms to the race and sexual
psychology of the inmates.168  In 1847, Francis C. Gray compared an Auburn
model prison in Charlestown to the Eastern State Penitentiary at Cherry Hill,
and noted that both death and insanity rates at Cherry Hill far outstripped
those seen at Charlestown.169  He concluded that “it appears that the system
of constant separation [according to the Pennsylvania plan] . . . , even when
administered with the utmost humanity, produces so many cases of insanity
and of death as to indicate most clearly, that its general tendency is to enfee-
ble the body and the mind.”170
When Charles Dickens visited Cherry Hill in the early 1840s, he
recorded the following observations:
In the outskirts, stands a great prison, called the Eastern Penitentiary:
conducted on a plan peculiar to the state of Pennsylvania.  The system here,
is rigid, strict, and hopeless solitary confinement.  I believe it, in its effects, to
be cruel and wrong.
In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind, humane, and meant
for reformation; but I am persuaded that those who devised this system of
Prison Discipline, and those benevolent gentlemen who carry it into execu-
tion, do not know what it is that they are doing. . . . I hold this slow and daily
tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than
any torture of the body: and because its ghastly signs and tokens are not so
palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its
wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears
can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a secret punishment which
slumbering humanity is not roused up to stay.171
164 Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History
and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 456–57 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, The
Effects of Solitary Confinement].
165 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1617.
166 See Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 457.
167 See id. at 458 (citing SAMUEL GRIDLEY HOWE, AN ESSAY ON SEPARATE AND CONGREGATE
SYSTEMS ON PRISON DISCIPLINE 76 (Boston, William D. Ticknor & Co. 1846)).
168 See id.
169 See FRANCIS C. GRAY, PRISON DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 106, 109 (London, John Murray
1848); see also Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 460 (discussing
Gray report).
170 GRAY, supra note 169, at 181.
171 CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 123–24 (Paris, A. &
W. Galignani & Co. 1842).  Similarly, when Hans Christian Andersen visited a Swedish
prison run according to the Pennsylvania plan, he wrote, “the stillness of the grave rests
over it.  It is as if no one dwelt here, or like a deserted mansion in time of plague. . . .  The
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Other states that instituted long-term solitary confinement experienced
problems similar to those described above.  Total isolation led prisoners to
despair, insanity, and suicide.172  For example, the physician for the New
Jersey Penitentiary, which initially followed the Pennsylvania model, reported
that total isolation led to “many cases of insanity.”173  But once these condi-
tions were relaxed, the symptoms disappeared: “A little more intercourse
with each other, and a little more air in the yard, have the effect[ ] upon
mind and body, that warmth has upon the thermometer, almost every degree
of indulgence showing a corresponding rise in health of the individual.”174
For this reason, other states that used solitary confinement ultimately hewed
closer to the revised Auburn plan of partial solitary confinement combined
with congregate labor than the Pennsylvania plan of total isolation.175
By the 1860s, the tide had turned against long-term solitary confine-
ment.  Penologists rejected the idea that either isolation or silence could
assist in the reform of prisoners.176  Rather, such practices were seen as
pointless exercises that significantly harmed the well-being of prisoners for
no good reason.  By 1866, even Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary at
Cherry Hill had started housing more than one prisoner to a cell.177  By the
1870s and 1880s, both the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems had largely dis-
appeared.178  As Peter Scharff Smith put it, “The founding nation of the
modern prison systems—the United States—was among the first to abandon
large scale solitary confinement.”179
whole is a well-built machine—a nightmare for the spirit.” HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN,
PICTURES OF SWEDEN 55–56 (London, Richard Bentley 1851); see also Smith, The Effects of
Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 460 (discussing Andersen’s visit, as well as other
nineteenth-century observations relating to solitary confinement).
172 See Haney & Lynch, supra note 143, at 484.
173 See Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 459 (quoting PRISON
DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 82 (1843), reprinted in 2 REPORTS OF THE
PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY 219, 300 (Boston, T.R. Marvin 1855)).
174 Id. (quoting PRISON DISCIPLINE SOC’Y, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 60 (1842),
reprinted in 2 REPORTS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 173, at 109, 168).
175 See Haney & Lynch, supra note 143, at 483–84; Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confine-
ment, supra note 164, at 459.
176 See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 111, 124–25 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995); Smith,
The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 465.
177 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 242 (1971).
178 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1617.
179 Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 465; see also Haney &
Lynch, supra note 143, at 487 (noting that by the early twentieth century, the use of long-
term solitary confinement “in actual practice . . . had largely ended”); Alexander A. Rei-
nert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 939 (2018) (“[B]y the turn of the nine-
teenth century, the experiment with widespread use of solitary appeared to be over.”).
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C. Solitary Confinement on the Margins: The 1880s to the 1980s
Although long-term solitary confinement largely disappeared in the
decades after the Civil War, shorter-term solitary confinement survived for
specific (often underground) purposes—specifically, to discipline unruly
prisoners and to house capital offenders awaiting execution.180
The use of shorter-term solitary confinement to punish prisoners for vio-
lations of prison rules dates back to the beginning of the American prison
experiment.181  The Walnut Street Prison used its solitary cells partly for this
purpose.182  Similarly, the Eastern State Penitentiary at Cherry Hill used
“dark cells” to punish prison misbehavior.183  In the dark cells, all sources of
external light were blocked so that the prisoner was kept in total darkness.184
The prisoner was given only bread and water, and was given no work or
books to keep his mind occupied.185  This punishment lasted anywhere from
a day to two weeks, and typically ended when the prisoner apologized and
promised to behave better in the future.186  Such practices continued in
American prisons after the rejection of long-term solitary confinement—for
example, the federal prison at Alcatraz used the “Spanish dungeons” to disci-
pline prison troublemakers until it closed in 1963.187  The details of these
practices were often not well known outside of the prisons, as they were
imposed as a matter of internal prison discipline, and prisoners did not have
much access to the courts throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury.188  When such practices did receive publicity, they were heavily
criticized.189
Solitary confinement also came to be used to house prisoners awaiting
execution.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of
states passed laws that not only relocated executions from the public square
to the inside of the penitentiary, but also moved condemned prisoners from
local jails to solitary confinement in state penitentiaries.190  This relocation
180 See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 179, at 939–40 (noting these uses of solitary confine-
ment and observing that by the beginning of the twentieth century, “long-term solitary
confinement was unusual in the United States, either explicitly abolished by statute or,
even if permissible, having fallen into disrepute and disfavor by prison administrators,” and
“terms of confinement in solitary were measured in days and weeks, not months or years”).
181 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1613.
182 See id.




187 See id. at 1620 (quoting PIERRE ODIER, THE ROCK 117 (1982)).
188 Cf. id. at 1621 (noting that courts became increasingly receptive to prisoner litiga-
tion in the latter half of the twentieth century).
189 See id. at 1620 (describing a 1938 expose´ by the Saturday Evening Post of the warden
at Alcatraz’s effort to revive an Auburn-type system of partial solitary confinement with
silent congregate labor, which apparently resulted in more than a dozen instances of
insanity).
190 See GARLAND, supra note 8, at 52, 116–17.
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was advertised as an effort to prevent the coarsening of public sensibilities
that comes with making execution a public “spectacle,” but it appears also to
have been motivated by a desire to reduce public opposition to the death
penalty by hiding it from public view.191
The decision to house condemned prisoners in solitary confinement
prior to execution attracted the attention of the United States Supreme
Court in the case In re Medley.192  The petitioner, James Medley, committed a
murder in May of 1889.193  In July of 1889, prior to Medley’s trial and convic-
tion, a new law took effect that changed the procedures for imposing the
death penalty.194  Under the old law, prisoners awaiting execution were kept
in a county jail for a period of fifteen to twenty-five days before being exe-
cuted by hanging.195  Both the jail term and the execution were supervised
by the county sheriff.196  The new law took things out of the hands of county
officials and placed an emphasis on solitude and secrecy.  Under the new law,
a prisoner sentenced to death would be kept in solitary confinement in the
state penitentiary for two to four weeks prior to execution.197  The execution
would take place “enclosed from public view within the walls of the peniten-
tiary.”198  The planned date and time of the execution were to be kept strictly
secret, and witnesses to the event were not permitted to describe it afterward
to anyone else.199
The Medley Court held that this statute could not be applied to the peti-
tioner because it was an ex post facto law.200  Requiring the prisoner to
remain in solitary confinement prior to execution added such significant suf-
fering to his sentence that it could not be imposed on a prisoner whose crime
occurred before the statute took effect.201  The Court noted that in England
191 See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 8, at 148; JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK 25
(1997); GARLAND, supra note 8, at 135; MASUR, supra note 114, at 53; Michael Madow,
Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the Public and the Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF.
L. REV. 461, 467 (1995).
192 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
193 Id. at 161.
194 Id. at 161–62.
195 Id. at 167.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 163–64.
198 Id. at 163 (quoting Act of Apr. 19, 1889, § 1, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 118, 118).
199 Id. at 164 (“The time fixed by said warden for said execution shall be by him kept
secret and in no manner divulged, except privately to the persons by him invited to be
present as aforesaid, and such persons so invited shall not divulge such invitation to any
person or persons whomsoever nor in any manner disclose the time of such execution.  All
persons present at such execution shall keep whatever may transpire thereat secret and
inviolate, save and except the facts certified to by them as hereinafter provided.  No
account of the details of any such execution, beyond the statement of the fact that such
convict was on the day in question duly executed according to law at the state penitentiary,
shall in any manner be published in this State.” (quoting § 3, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws at
119)).
200 Id. at 172, 174.
201 Id. at 172.
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during the reign of George II, solitary confinement was authorized prior to
execution in order to add “further terror and [a] peculiar mark of infamy” to
the sentence.202  The law was repealed under William IV because “[i]n Great
Britain, as in other countries, public sentiment revolted against this sever-
ity.”203  The Court also discussed America’s own experiment with long-term
solitary confinement:
[E]xperience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it.  A con-
siderable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a
semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
and others became violently insane, others, still, committed suicide, while
those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most
cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent ser-
vice to the community. . . .
. . . [S]ome thirty or forty years ago the whole subject attracted the gen-
eral public attention, and its main feature of solitary confinement was found
to be too severe.204
Because the effects of solitary confinement were so harsh, the decision to
move a prisoner into solitary confinement could not be considered a mere
administrative action—even though the confinement would last only four
weeks at the most, and even though the offender was already sentenced to
death.205  Solitary confinement added such additional “terror” and “severity”
to the death penalty that it had to be considered a new punishment.206  The
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto punishments meant that it could
not be imposed on an offender who committed the crime before the law
went into effect.207
After Medley, the Supreme Court clarified that offenders awaiting execu-
tion could be kept in solitary confinement so long as the statute did not vio-
late the prohibition of ex post facto laws208—although it is important to
remember that at that time, the period between sentence and execution was
a matter of weeks, not months, years, or (as now) decades.209  Cases involving
solitary confinement as a mode of prison discipline arose on occasion, but
202 Id. at 170 (quoting Murder Act 1751, 25 Geo. 2 c. 37, § 1 (Eng.)).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 168.
205 Id. at 163.
206 Id. at 170.
207 Id. at 174.
208 See Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 494 (1890) (upholding statute similar to the
one at issue in Medley on the ground that it did not apply to punishments for crimes com-
mitted prior to statute’s effective date); see also McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158–59
(1891) (refusing to decide claim that imposition of solitary confinement under New York
sentencing statute was a cruel and unusual punishment because the Eighth Amendment
did not apply to the states).
209 See Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of Legisla-
tive Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 528 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 30 26-NOV-19 8:34
68 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
these generally involved shorter-term solitary confinement, and often did not
raise questions about the cruelty of solitude in and of itself.210
Once in a blue moon, a case arose revealing that some prison officials
were keeping some offenders in solitary confinement for much longer peri-
ods of time.  But even in these cases, questions about the cruelty of the prac-
tice were generally not directly presented to the court.  For example, in People
v. Oppenheimer,211 the defendant challenged a death sentence he received for
assault with a deadly weapon while serving a life sentence in prison.  The
defendant committed the assault after escaping from a solitary cell the prison
used for “incorrigible[s],” in which he had been held for eight years.212  The
defendant raised an insanity defense, arguing that long-term solitary confine-
ment had caused him to go insane.213  But he did not argue that his
extended solitary confinement was cruel and unusual under the California
Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishments clause.214
Similarly, in Stroud v. Johnston,215 Robert Stroud (the “Birdman of Alca-
traz”) filed a petition for habeas corpus on various grounds, one of which
related to his conditions of confinement.  Stroud had been sentenced to
death for killing a prison guard, but the President commuted the death sen-
tence to life imprisonment and the Attorney General ordered that he be held
in solitary confinement.216  Stroud then spent over twenty years at Leaven-
worth before being transferred to Alcatraz, after which he filed this peti-
tion.217  Stroud argued that extended solitary confinement was a cruel and
unusual punishment.  The court rejected this argument, however, noting
that he had experienced only “‘limited solitary confinement’ at Leaven-
worth, Kansas, and . . . he enjoyed most of the privileges of other prisoners;
[and] that on the face of his petition it appears he is not in solitary confine-
ment at Alcatraz and is accorded the same treatment as is accorded other
prison inmates.”218  Because there was no showing that he was currently kept
in solitary confinement, the court refused to consider his Eighth Amendment
claim as a ground for habeas relief.219
210 See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 10 N.E.2d 594, 596–97 (Ind. 1937) (rejecting mentally ill
prisoner’s claim that keeping him in solitary confinement prior to trial was a denial of due
process because it made it difficult to subpoena witnesses, prepare for his defense, etc.);
Sims v. Hudspeth, 203 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1949) (rejecting prisoner’s claim that he was
denied right to counsel because authorities used threat of solitary confinement to get him
to sign waiver of counsel form).
211 106 P. 74, 76 (Cal. 1909).
212 Id. at 77, 78.
213 Id. at 78.
214 Id. at 77.  He did argue, however, that the statute authorizing the death penalty for
his assault was cruel and unusual. Id.
215 139 F.2d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1943).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
219 Id. at 172–73.
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D. Forgetfulness and Resurgence: The Rise of Supermax
The period between 1890 and the 1970s might be considered a time of
forgetting.  Solitary confinement existed at the margins of penal practice,
and long-term solitary confinement was largely invisible.220  By the 1960s and
1970s, judicial opinions concerning solitary confinement often showed a lack
of awareness of the psychological suffering it caused, or treated psychological
suffering as less “real” than physical suffering.221
With this forgetfulness came an increased willingness to categorize soli-
tary confinement—even long-term solitary confinement—as an unremark-
able exercise of administrative discretion.  For example, in Graham v.
Willingham,222 a prisoner named Kenneth Graham challenged his relegation
to solitary confinement for a period of two years as a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.  Several years previously, Graham had murdered a fellow inmate.223
In subsequent years, he was present when two further murders were commit-
ted, although there was no showing that he was involved in them.224  As a
result, he was placed in solitary confinement “not . . . as a disciplinary control
for specific misconduct but as an administrative control relating to inmates
considered to be a ‘threat to themselves, to others, or to the safety and secur-
ity of the institution.’”225  The Tenth Circuit dismissed Graham’s Eighth
Amendment claim in a one-page opinion that did not cite In re Medley and
showed no awareness that long-term solitary confinement might have harm-
ful effects on prisoner well-being.226  Instead, the court simply asserted that
such confinement is not a cruel and unusual punishment, and that “adminis-
trative” matters such as prison order should be left to the discretion and
expertise of prison officials.227
220 See Rubin & Reiter, supra note 138, at 1618; see also Smith, The Effects of Solitary
Confinement, supra note 164, at 465.
221 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We decline to
enter this uncharted bog.  If the State furnishes its prisoners with reasonably adequate
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so as to avoid the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that ends its obligations under Amendment
Eight.  The Constitution does not require that prisoners . . . be provided with any and every
amenity which some person may think is needed to avoid mental, physical, and emotional
deterioration.”), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). See generally Haney & Lynch, supra note 143, at 543–44.
222 384 F.2d 367, 367–68 (10th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
223 Id. at 368.
224 Id.
225 Id. (quoting Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Policy Statement 7400.4 (Sept.
9, 1966)).
226 See id.
227 See id. (“Such a policy is perfectly proper and lawful and its administration requires
the highest degree of expertise in the discretionary function of balancing the security of
the prison with fairness to the individuals confined.  In the case at bar the record reveals
that appellant’s confinement in segregation is the result of the considered judgment of the
prison authorities and is not arbitrary.”).
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The United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in the late 1970s
that appeared to display this same forgetfulness.  On the surface, Hutto v.
Finney228 was a victory for prisoners.  The Supreme Court upheld a district
court’s determination that the Arkansas prison system’s use of punitive isola-
tion was a cruel and unusual punishment.229  The Court described the condi-
tions of isolation as follows:
An average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, prisoners were crowded
into windowless 8’x10’ cells containing no furniture other than a source of
water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell.  At night
the prisoners were given mattresses to spread on the floor.  Although some
prisoners suffered from infectious diseases such as hepatitis and venereal
disease, mattresses were removed and jumbled together each morning, then
returned to the cells at random in the evening.  Prisoners in isolation
received fewer than 1,000 calories a day; their meals consisted primarily of 4-
inch squares of “grue,” a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo,
syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in
a pan.230
The Court agreed that, “taken as a whole,”231 the prisoners’ “diet, the contin-
ued overcrowding, the rampant violence, the vandalized cells, and the ‘lack
of professionalism and good judgment on the part of maximum security per-
sonnel’”232 created conditions that violated the Eighth Amendment.
At the same time, the Court showed a lack of awareness that long-term
solitary confinement was harmful in and of itself.  The Court stated that
“[t]he length of time each inmate spen[ds] in isolation [is] simply one con-
sideration among many,”233 and “[i]f new conditions of confinement are not
materially different from those affecting other prisoners, a transfer for the
duration of a prisoner’s sentence might be completely unobjectionable and
well within the authority of the prison administrator.”234  The Court did not
cite In re Medley, and did not make any reference to the harmful effects of
long-term isolation.235  It seemed to say that so long as the physical condi-
228 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
229 Id. at 680–81.
230 Id. at 682–83 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
231 Id. at 687.
232 Id. (quoting Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 277 (E.D. Ark. 1976)).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 686.
235 It is possible to read the Court’s bland approval of long-term punitive isolation as
having nothing to do with solitary confinement, since the “punitive isolation” most directly
at issue in this case did not involve solitary confinement but its opposite: the dumping of
four to eleven troublesome prisoners in a single “isolation” cell.  However, this reading is
undercut by a footnote in which the Court expressly disclaims any reading of the district
court’s opinion, or of its own approval thereof, that implies that long-term solitary confine-
ment is unconstitutional:
The Department reads the following sentence in the District Court’s 76-page
opinion as an unqualified holding that any indeterminate sentence to solitary
confinement is unconstitutional . . . .  But in the context of its full opinion, we
think it quite clear that the court was describing the specific conditions found in
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tions of solitary confinement—heat, light, food, access to medical care, etc.—
were comparable to those in the general prison population, prison adminis-
trators had virtually limitless discretion to subject prisoners to it for virtually
any length of time.
A series of factors arose in the 1970s and 1980s that led to the imposition
of long-term solitary confinement on a grander scale than ever previously
tried.  During the 1970s, prison riots created the sense that prison adminis-
trators were losing the ability to control their own prisons and keep guards,
prisoners, and the general public safe.236  This led to a push for increased
disciplinary tools to subdue disorder, including long-term solitary
confinement.237
The sense of disorder in America’s prisons reflected a larger sense of
societal disorder after the end of the civil rights movement and in the wake
of the Vietnam War.238  Rising crime rates—particularly rising rates of vio-
lent crime and an increased focus on drug crime—gave rise to a “tough on
crime” movement and an explosion in incarceration.239  The total number of
people incarcerated in American prisons and jails increased by approxi-
mately 620% between 1970 and 2016, from 300,000 to 2,162,400.240  Much of
this growth occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.241  This increase in prison pop-
ulation led to significant overcrowding and further concern over prison
administrators’ ability to control their populations.242
The supermax movement was born in October 1983 at the federal
prison in Marion, Illinois.243  Marion was designed to replace Alcatraz as the
one of the federal government’s main prisons for housing violent and disrup-
tive offenders.244  A series of violent incidents occurred at Marion, culminat-
the Arkansas penal system.  Indeed, in the same paragraph it noted that “segre-
gated confinement under maximum security conditions is one thing; segregated
confinement under the punitive conditions that have been described is quite
another thing.”
Id. at 686 n.8 (quoting 410 F. Supp. at 278).
236 See Sarah Spiegel, Comment, Prison “Race Riots”: An Easy Case for Segregation?, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 2261, 2270 (2007).  Whereas there were twenty-four reported prison riots
from 1900–1950, there were two hundred forty-two in the 1970s alone. See REID H. MONT-
GOMERY, JR. & GORDON A. CREWS, A HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL VIOLENCE 74 (1998).
237 See Spiegel, supra note 236, at 2274–75.
238 For a discussion of various social forces at work that gave rise to a harsher criminal
justice system, see generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS (2006).
239 See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 MICH. L. REV.
951, 960–61 (2016).
240 See supra note 6.
241 See Berman, supra note 6, at 162–65.
242 See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological Conse-
quences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 270 (2006).
243 See Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 442–43.
244 See Haney & Lynch, supra note 143, at 489.
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ing in the murder of two guards and an inmate.245  In response, the warden
declared an emergency and put the entire prison on permanent lockdown,
relegating all prisoners to solitary confinement in their cells twenty-three
hours per day.246  This lockdown remained in effect until 2006, when the
prison was redesignated as a medium-security facility.247
The lockdown at Marion inspired the creation of a new class of prison,
known colloquially as “supermax,” designed to eliminate virtually all contact
between prisoners and other people.248  Although conditions vary somewhat
from facility to facility, the court’s description in Madrid v. Gomez249 of the
special housing unit (SHU) at California’s Pelican Bay State  Prison250 gives a
sense of what life in a supermax facility is like.251
The Madrid court found that at Pelican Bay’s SHU, prisoners in solitary
confinement were kept alone in their cells twenty-two and a half hours per
day.252  They received their meals on trays passed through a narrow slot in
the cell door.253  Inmates ate their meals alone in their cells, and were pre-
245 Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 442–43; Hanke Gratteu,
Marion Inmate 27, Is Stabbed to Death, CHI. TRIB. (June 6, 1985), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-06-06-8502050496-story.html.
246 Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 442–43.
247 See United States v. Caro, 733 Fed. App’x 651, 671 n.8 (4th Cir. 2018).
248 See Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 442–43.
249 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
250 In 2015, the parties to a class-action lawsuit concerning conditions at Pelican Bay
settled the matter with an agreement to end imposition of indefinite solitary confinement.
See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF ASHKER V. GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA
SETTLEMENT TERMS (2015), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/
2015-09-01-Ashker-settlement-summary.pdf.  There has continued to be litigation, however,
concerning California’s compliance with the settlement. See, e.g., Victoria Law, ‘As Long as
Solitary Exists, They Will Find a Way to Use It,’ NATION (July 13, 2018), https://
www.thenation.com/article/long-solitary-exists-will-find-way-use/.
251 See United States v. Fell, 224 F. Supp. 3d 327, 346–47 (D. Vt. 2016) (describing
conditions at the federal supermax facility in Terre Haute, Indiana).  In a survey of Ameri-
can prisons, the Liman Center described typical living conditions for prisoners in long-
term solitary confinement as follows:
As for living conditions, the cells were small, ranging from 45 to 128 square feet,
sometimes for two people.  In many places, prisoners spent 23 hours in their cells
on weekdays and 48 hours straight on weekends.
Opportunities for social contact, such as out-of-cell time for exercise, visits,
and programs, were limited; the time out-of-cell ranged from 3 to 7 hours a week
in many jurisdictions.  Phone calls and social visits were as few as one per month
in several jurisdictions; in others, more opportunities existed.  In virtually all juris-
dictions, what the prisoners could keep in their cells, as well as their access to
programs and to social contact, could be limited as sanctions for misbehavior.
LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE L. SCH. & ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-
ASCA 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON, at ii (2015)
[hereinafter LIMAN & ASCA, TIME-IN-CELL].
252 Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1229.
253 Id.
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vented from having social interaction with each other.254  They were denied
access to prison job opportunities and recreational activities, spending almost
all of their time in total idleness.255  Group exercise was also forbidden.256
Instead, for about one hour per day, each inmate was placed alone in a caged
area resembling a dog run.257  Very often, this exercise amounted to “simply
pacing around the edges of the pen; the image created is hauntingly similar
to that of caged felines pacing in a zoo.”258
Interaction with other human beings, including prison staff, was kept to
an “absolute minimum.”259  For example, prisoners were let into their exer-
cise areas through a series of automatic doors, so that there was no human
contact.260  On the rare occasions when a guard had to have personal contact
with a prisoner, the prisoner would be kept in shackles.261  Because Pelican
Bay was in an isolated location, prisoners received few outside visitors.262
When they did receive a visitor, the visit was conducted by telephone through
a thick glass window.263  Prisoners had some ability to interact with other
human beings when they needed medical treatment or requested spiritual
counseling, but not much beyond that.264  The district court concluded that
“those incarcerated in the SHU for any length of time are severely deprived
of normal human contact . . . . As former Warden Fenton testified, condi-
tions in the SHU amount to a ‘virtual total deprivation, including, insofar as
possible, deprivation of human contact.’”265
The idea of supermax prisons was very popular with state and federal
legislators in the 1980s and 1990s.  According to one estimate, by 2004 some
forty-four states and the District of Columbia had opened supermax prisons,





257 Id. at 1228.







265 Id. at 1230.
266 See DANIEL P. MEARS, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 40
(2006).  The most recent Liman Center survey indicates that about 61,000 prisoners were
being held in solitary confinement as of 2017. See ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & LIMAN
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018
ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 4 (2018) [hereinafter ASCA & LIMAN,
REFORMING].  Although not all states track length of confinement, states that did track and
report this information indicated that 18.8% of the offenders held in solitary confinement
had been kept there a year or more. See id. at 14.  If this ratio holds true across all states,
this would mean that nearly 11,500 prisoners are currently being held in solitary confine-
ment for a year or more.
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In theory, supermax prisons are supposed to house only the “worst of
the worst” offenders: the incurably violent who will take any chance they can
get to harm other people; the gang leaders who use murder and violence to
control prisons from the inside; the would-be revolutionaries who will stop at
nothing to burn the place down.267  But in reality, a person can be assigned
to supermax not just when that person is a security threat, but also when that
person “is under a sentence of death, is a youthful offender, is at risk of
attack by others, is seriously mentally ill, or has a major medical problem.”268
Even when a person is designated a security threat, this designation may con-
ceal a very broad range of administrative discretion.  For example, in a num-
ber of states, a person can be sent to supermax simply for being affiliated
with a gang, and often cannot obtain release without agreeing to a
“debriefing” in which he names all other gang members in the prison of
whom he has knowledge.269
Solitary confinement in supermax facilities is indefinite.  It appears that
nearly 11,500 prisoners are currently spending a year or more in solitary con-
finement, and nearly 3000 are currently spending six years or more.270  Some
offenders have been held in solitary confinement for decades.271
E. Accidental Resurgence: The Extension of Time on Death Row
The law of unintended consequences has also led to an increase in the
number of condemned prisoners spending multiyear periods in solitary con-
finement.  As discussed above, the late nineteenth-century decision to move
executions out of the public square and behind the walls of the penitentiary
was accompanied by the movement of condemned prisoners into solitary
confinement on death row.272  At the time this occurred, the period between
sentence and execution was typically a few weeks.273  Prisoner civil rights liti-
gation over the course of the twentieth century, however, had the perverse
effect of lengthening the time prisoners spent on death row as the courts
267 See MEARS, supra note 266, at 5.
268 Elizabeth Alexander, “This Experiment, So Fatal”: Some Initial Thoughts on Strategic
Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 11 (2015).
269 See, e.g., Katie Lynn Joyce, Note, Stars, Dragons, and the Letter “M”: Consequential Sym-
bols in California Prison Gang Policy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 750–51 (2016).
270 See supra note 266; see also ASCA & LIMAN, REFORMING, supra note 266, at 4, 14
(estimating that 61,000 prisoners were being held in solitary confinement as of 2017, and
noting that 18.8% of the offenders held in solitary confinement had been kept there a year
or more, and that 1950 of 41,061, about 4.7%, had been kept there for more than six
years).
271 See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (prisoner held in isolation on
death row for over twenty years); Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 770 (M.D. Pa.
2016) (prisoner kept in solitary confinement for thirty-six years); Shoatz v. Wetzel, No.
2:13-CV-0657, 2016 WL 595337, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016) (prisoner kept in solitary
confinement for twenty-two years).
272 See supra Section II.C.
273 See, e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 163, 167 (1890) (two to four weeks).
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enabled appeals of death sentences to go on for years or even decades.274  By
1960, the average time spent on death row had increased to two years.275
Today, the average time between sentence and execution is sixteen years.276
Most death penalty states keep condemned prisoners in some form of isola-
tion, and many keep them in total isolation throughout this period.277
F. The Tide Withdraws? Gradual Diminishment of Long-Term Solitary
Confinement
In recent years, the number of prisoners subjected to long-term solitary
confinement has diminished, although thousands of prisoners remain sub-
jected to it.  Prisoner litigation has had some success,278 and in California led
to a settlement that eliminated (in theory) indefinite solitary confinement.279
Several Supreme Court Justices have expressed concerns about the constitu-
tionality of long-term solitary confinement and a possible willingness to strike
it down.280
The gradual reduction in the number of inmates subjected to long-term
solitary confinement is reflected in a series of surveys taken by the Arthur
Liman Center for Public Interest Law at Yale Law School.281  The Liman
274 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In 2014,
35 individuals were executed.  Those executions occurred, on average, nearly 18 years after
a court initially pronounced its sentence of death.”); id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the delays have been caused by “[n]othing other than the proliferation of
labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment, promulgated by this Court under an inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment that empowered it to divine ‘the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
275 See McLeod, supra note 209, at 536.
276 See id.; see also, e.g., Peter Baumann, Note, “Waiting on Death”: Nathan Dunlap and the
Cruel Effect of Uncertainty, 106 GEO. L.J. 871 (2018) (discussing the cruel effects of long-term
isolation on death row).
277 See McLeod, supra note 209, at 537.
278 See, e.g., Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 574–75 (3d Cir. 2017)
(holding that prisoners no longer subject to the death penalty have a due process right
against indefinite solitary confinement).
279 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 250, at 1 (noting settlement of
Ashker litigation in California).
280 See Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 10 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of
certiorari) (noting “the clear constitutional problems raised by keeping prisoners . . . in
‘near-total isolation’ from the living world . . . in what comes perilously close to a penal
tomb” (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)));
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “pro-
longed solitary confinement produces numerous deleterious harms” and has a “dehuman-
izing effect”); Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Years on end of near-
total isolation exact a terrible price. . . . In a case that presented the issue, the judiciary may
be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether workable
alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional sys-
tem should be required to adopt them.”).
281 See ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM, RETHINKING DEATH ROW 17 (2016);
ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH.,
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Center estimates that in 2015, there were approximately 67,000 inmates in
“restrictive housing,” approximately 13,000 of whom were kept in this condi-
tion for more than a year.282  By contrast, the Liman Center estimates that in
the period between December 2016 and fall 2017, there were approximately
61,000 inmates in restrictive housing.283  The data on length of time in
restrictive housing was less complete, but indicated that 18.8% of these
inmates (or approximately 11,500 people)284 spent a year or more in solitary
confinement.285
This data shows an approximate 10% reduction in the use of solitary
confinement in the period between 2015 and 2017.  The most recent Liman
Center report also indicates that prison administrators are looking for alter-
natives to this method of incarceration.286  We may be repeating the pattern
we saw at the end of the nineteenth century, when long-term solitary confine-
ment mostly disappeared.287  We are not there yet, however.  Currently 4.7%
of the inmates in solitary confinement, or nearly 3000 people,288 have spent
six consecutive years or more in total isolation.
G. Is Long-Term Solitary Confinement a “Usual” Punishment?
The history of long-term solitary confinement indicates that it is not a
“usual” method of punishment within the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, and it is likely a cruel and unusual one.  As
discussed above, a punishment can only be considered “usual”—that is,
firmly part of the constitutional tradition—if it enjoys universal, public recep-
tion over a very long period of time.289  Although the precise period of time
necessary to establish a punishment as “usual” cannot be defined with preci-
sion, history indicates that it would likely need to be a century or more of
universal reception.290
Long-term solitary confinement has not enjoyed anything close to “long
usage.”  It was tried for several decades in the nineteenth century but was
then largely abandoned because its effects were too harsh.291  It was never
AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL 2 (2016); ASCA & LIMAN, REFORMING, supra note 266, at
99; ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, YALE LAW SCH.,
WORKING TO LIMIT RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 19 (2018); LIMAN & ASCA, TIME-IN-CELL, supra
note 251, at 55.
282 See ASCA & LIMAN, REFORMING, supra note 266, at 8.  The Liman Center defines
restrictive housing as “separating prisoners from the general population and holding them
in their cells for an average of 22 hours or more per day for 15 continuous days or more.”
Id. at 4.
283 Id. at 10.
284 See supra notes 266, 270 and accompanying text.
285 ASCA & LIMAN, REFORMING, supra note 266, at 14.
286 See id. at 4–6.
287 See supra Section II.C.
288 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
289 See supra Section I.A.
290 See supra Section I.A.
291 See supra Section II.B.
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used in all American jurisdictions, and for much of its life in the nineteenth
century it was confined to Pennsylvania and a small number of “copycat”
states.292  Thus it never achieved universal reception, and the reception it did
receive lasted well under one hundred years.293  To the extent that long-term
solitary confinement survived in the period between 1870 and 1970, it was
largely imposed behind the scenes by prison administrators, and thus lacked
the “public” character necessary to make it part of the constitutional
tradition.294
It is also important to consider the reasons long-term solitary confine-
ment failed to achieve long usage.  The historical record provides over-
whelming evidence that it was rejected because of its cruel effects.295  This
fact provides strong evidence that the practice is cruel and unusual.  To con-
firm whether this intuition is correct, the next step is to examine empirical
evidence concerning the comparative effects of long-term solitary
confinement.
III. MEASURING CRUELTY
Aristotle observed that man a social animal, and that “he who is unable
to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself,
must be either a beast or a god.”296  Our current experiment with long-term
solitary confinement tests this claim.  Can we isolate a person from all human
society for a period of months, years, or decades without destroying (or at
least seriously damaging) his psyche?  A beast or a god might withstand such
conditions, but can a human being?
The question of cruelty is a comparative one.  The Eighth Amendment
does not direct us to ask whether a punishment is unjustly harsh in the
abstract, but whether it is unjustly harsh in comparison to the traditional
punishment it replaces.297  In this case, relevant comparison is between soli-
tary confinement and imprisonment with some opportunity for social
interaction.
A. Establishing a Baseline: Happiness in Prison
Since the late 1970s, behavioral psychologists have studied the effects of
positive or negative events on the overall happiness or well-being of peo-
ple.298  Through these studies, they have developed a theory of hedonic
adaptation—that is, the idea that relatively quickly after a positive or negative
event occurs, people tend to revert back to the level of happiness they occu-
292 See supra Section II.B.
293 See supra Section II.B.
294 See supra Section I.A.
295 See supra Section II.B.
296 ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 29 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1908).
297 See supra Part I.
298 See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1041
(2009) (describing studies).
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pied before the event.299  Lottery winners were found to be not much hap-
pier, over the long run, than members of a control group.300  People
paralyzed in an accident were found to be not much less happy, over the long
run, than they were before the accident.301  Although the positive or negative
experience may create heightened positive or negative feelings in the short
term, such feelings tend to revert back toward their pre-event level as the
everydayness of life takes over once again.302
Studies also show that there are exceptions to this rule:
People seem less likely to adapt to some health-related stimuli like noise,
chronic headaches, and certain degenerative diseases such as rheumatoid
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, HIV/AIDS, and hepatitis C infections.  Addition-
ally, socially relevant stimuli such as divorce, the death of a spouse, and
unemployment prove difficult to adapt to, with hedonic penalties lasting for
a considerable time into the future.303
Events that cause ongoing pain or deep social loss can keep us from
returning to our previous level of happiness or well-being.
Hedonic adaptation appears to apply to life in prison.  Both cross-sec-
tional and longitudinal studies have shown that prisoners at the beginning of
their sentences tend to show very high levels of depression and anxiety.304
But as prisoners spend more time in prison, these symptoms tend to recede
quickly, and several years into a sentence levels of happiness generally settle
relatively close to the “normal” range.305
B. Suffering in Supermax
The experience of long-term solitary confinement is quite different.
Studies of inmate well-being show alarming levels of injury to prisoner well-
being that get worse over time.306  For example, Dr. Stuart Grassian has
299 See id.
300 See id.
301 See id. at 1041–42.
302 See id. (“Most people are reasonably happy most of the time, and most events do
little to change that for long.” (quoting Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of
Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 618 (1998))).
303 Id. at 1043–44 (footnotes omitted).
304 See id. at 1047–48.  Some groups of prisoners, of course, may not be able to adapt to
prison as well as others.  Mentally ill prisoners appear to be particularly vulnerable to harm
in prison. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and
Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 159–60 (2013) (“Prison is a toxic envi-
ronment for individuals with serious mental health problems.” (footnote omitted)).
305 See Bronsteen et al., supra note 298, at 1047–48.  Although these studies tend to
show that prisoner happiness tends to increase over the course of a prison term, other
studies show that incarceration can have a profoundly negative effect on one’s well-being
after release.  Former inmates suffer from higher unemployment, much lower wages,
chronic disease, and alienation form loved ones, all of which have been shown to reduce
one’s sense of happiness or well-being over the longer run. See id. at 1050–52.
306 The literature concerning the harmful effects of solitary confinement on prisoner
well-being is vast.  As discussed above, these effects were well-known in the nineteenth cen-
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made a number of studies of the effects of solitary confinement on inmate
well-being.307  In the early 1980s, he made his first such study, examining the
well-being of inmates subjected to solitary confinement in Walpole State
Prison in Massachusetts.308  Despite his initial skepticism about the potential
harmfulness of solitary confinement, he discovered widespread symptoms of
an “acute organic brain syndrome.”309  Specifically, he found that over 50%
of the prisoners exhibited one or more of the following symptoms: (1) hyper-
responsivity to external stimuli; (2) perceptual distortions, illusions, and hal-
lucinations; (3) panic attacks; (4) difficulties with thinking, concentration,
and memory; (5) intrusive obsessional thoughts; (6) overt paranoia; and (7)
problems with impulse control.310  Dr. Grassian found this constellation of
symptoms to be a “rare phenomenon in psychiatry,” and asserted that the
“striking and dramatically extensive perceptual disturbances” exhibited by
these inmates was very rare outside the context of neurological illnesses such
as seizure disorders and brain tumors.311
Similarly, in 1991 and 1992, Dr. Grassian evaluated forty-nine inmates at
Pelican Bay State Prison in California as part of a class-action case concerning
the constitutionality of long-term solitary confinement in that facility’s
SHU.312  Of these forty-nine inmates, “at least seventeen were actively
psychotic and/or acutely suicidal,” and “twenty-three others suffered serious
psychopathological reactions to solitary confinement, including (in several
tury.  Numerous modern studies in America and Europe have replicated these findings.
Many of these studies are summarized in the following literature reviews: Bruce A. Arrigo
and Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in
Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recommending What Should Change, 52 INT’L. J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622 (2008); Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the
Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741,
753–63 (2015); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 325 (2006); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 132 (2003) [hereinafter Haney, Mental Health Issues];
Haney & Lynch, supra note 143; Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164.  In
2010, a group of researchers published a study (known as the “Colorado study”) purport-
ing to show that prolonged solitary confinement has minimal negative effects and may
actually be beneficial for mentally ill prisoners. See MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE ET AL., ONE YEAR
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
(2010).  In 2016, a meta-analysis based largely on the Colorado study made similar finding.
See Robert D. Morgan et al., Quantitative Synthesis of the Effects of Administrative Segregation on
Inmates’ Well-Being, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 439 (2016).  Both of these studies have
been shown to be so deeply methodologically flawed as to be meaningless. See, e.g., Craig
Haney, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement: A Systematic Critique, 47 CRIME & JUS-
TICE 365 (2018); Stuart Grassian & Terry A. Kupers, The Colorado Study vs. The Reality of
Supermax Confinement, 13 CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP. 1 (2011).
307 See Grassian, supra note 306, at 327.
308 See id. at 333–34.
309 Id. at 337–38.
310 Id. at 335–36.
311 Id. at 337.
312 See id. at 349.
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cases) periods of psychotic disorganization.”313  Examining Dr. Grassian’s
report, the court noted that of these “40 seriously ill inmates, 28 suffered
from perceptual disturbances, 35 had [trouble concentrating], 22 exper-
ienced intrusive obsessional thoughts, 29 [experienced] paranoia, 28 had
impulse dyscontrol, 25 [experienced] anxiety/panic disorder, and 24 suf-
fered from overt psychotic disorganization.”314
As part of the same litigation, Dr. Craig Haney performed a study of one
hundred randomly selected inmates in the Pelican Bay SHU.315  The study
showed that nearly 90% of inmates suffered a psychopathological effect, and
nearly half suffered from “extreme forms of psychopathology.”316  Moving
from the least common symptoms to the most common: 27% experienced
suicidal thoughts; 41% experienced hallucinations; 44% experienced percep-
tual distortions; 61% experienced violent fantasies; 63% talked to themselves;
67% reported overall deterioration; 71% experienced mood swings; 73%
experienced emotional flatness; 77% experienced chronic depression; 83%
experienced social withdrawal; 84% experienced confused thought
processes; 86% experienced oversensitivity to stimuli; 88% experienced irra-
tional anger; and 88% experienced ruminations.317  In light of this data, Dr.
Haney wrote: “Because supermax units typically meld sophisticated modern
technology with the age-old practice of solitary confinement, prisoners expe-
rience levels of isolation and behavioral control that are more total and com-
plete and literally dehumanized than has been possible in the past.”318
Dr. Grassian’s studies also tend to show that the same personality charac-
teristics that cause many people to violate prison rules (and thus get sent to
long-term solitary confinement) also make these people highly vulnerable to
psychological harm from long-term solitary confinement.319  For example, in
one case involving a maximum-security prison in New York in the late 1980s,
a group of female prisoners with a history of serious emotional or mental
difficulties were put into the prison’s SHU for violations of prison rules.320
As a result, “[m]any became grossly disorganized and psychotic, smearing
themselves with feces, mumbling and screaming incoherently all day and
night, some even descending to the horror of eating parts of their own bod-
ies.”321  Similarly, according to Dr. Grassian, research indicates that people
who suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or antisocial personal-
ity disorder have a “particular inability to tolerate restricted environmental
313 Id.
314 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
315 See Haney, Mental Health Issues, supra note 306, at 132.
316 Id. at 134.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 127.
319 See Grassian, supra note 306, at 350–51; see also, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff
George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax
Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U.L. REV. 1 (2012).
320 Grassian, supra note 306, at 351.
321 Id.
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stimulation” and are likely to suffer serious breakdowns in solitary confine-
ment.322  More generally:
[I]ndividuals whose internal emotional life is chaotic and impulse-ridden
and individuals with central nervous system dysfunction may be especially
prone to psychopathologic reactions to restricted environmental stimulation
in a variety of settings.  Yet . . . it is quite likely that these are the very individ-
uals who are especially prone to committing infractions that result in stricter
incarceration, including severe isolation and solitary confinement.323
Psychologically more resilient inmates also experience serious psycho-
logical disturbances over the course of their time in solitary confinement.
For example, in a case involving a group of women kept in solitary confine-
ment after committing a politically motivated crime, Dr. Grassian found that
although the women were highly educated and showed no sign of prior
mental illness, each suffered “significant psychopathological reactions,”
including “perceptual disturbances, free-floating anxiety, . . . panic attacks[,]
. . . [and] severe difficulties in thinking, concentration, and memory.”324
In sum, studies of the well-being of prisoners in long-term solitary con-
finement show markedly different results than studies of well-being of prison-
ers generally.  Whereas the well-being of prisoners in the general prison
population tends to revert back toward the pre-incarceration level over time,
solitary confinement appears to have the opposite effect: serious psychologi-
cal harm that deepens over time.
C. Dealing with Selection Bias: Studies Comparing Inmates in Solitary
Confinement to Those in the General Prison Population
Although the discussion above appears to show that long-term solitary
confinement causes significantly more harm to prisoners than does imprison-
ment generally, it is possible that this is partly the result of selection bias.
That is, it might be the case that mentally ill inmates are more likely to get
placed in long-term solitary confinement because their mental illnesses lead
them to cause disruptions in the general prison population.325  If this is so,
the various psychological symptoms discussed above might not be caused by
solitary confinement, but by a preexisting psychological condition.  To be
certain that the difference in well-being is real, we must do an apples-to-
apples comparison of prisoners inside and outside of solitary confinement.
322 Id. at 350.
323 Id. at 350–51.
324 Id. at 352–53.
325 In fact, this does seem to be the case, at least in prisons that do not take affirmative
steps to screen inmates for mental illness before assigning them to solitary confinement.
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 304, at 160 (observing that mentally ill inmates “are more
likely to be charged with rule violations—often because they are too disorganized to follow
the many rules imposed by correctional facilities—and, as a result, are more likely to be
housed in solitary confinement” (footnotes omitted)).
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Several such direct comparisons have been performed.326  For example,
Dr. Craig Haney recently performed a study comparing the psychological
well-being of prisoners who had been held in the Pelican Bay SHU for ten
years or more to prisoners held in the general population of the same prison
for a comparable period of time.327  The study excluded prisoners listed on
the prison’s “mental health caseload,” as a previous court order had
excluded such prisoners from the SHU.328  Prisoners from both groups were
randomly selected.329  The study found that extremely long-term SHU pris-
oners reported nearly twice the number of stress-related trauma and isola-
tion-related pathology symptoms as prisoners in the general population.330
Similarly, the extreme long-term SHU prisoners showed much greater inten-
sity of stress, trauma, and isolation-related pathology symptoms.331  Finally,
the study found that “the prisoners in long-term solitary confinement were
not only significantly more lonely than the long-term [general population]
prisoners . . . , but also reported extremely high levels of loneliness rarely
found anywhere in the literature.”332
Similarly, Peter Scharff Smith describes two studies of Danish and Nor-
wegian “remand” prisoners performed in the 1990s that compare prisoners
subjected to solitary confinement prior to trial to those kept in the general
prison population.333  Smith explains that remand prisoners are defendants
who are incarcerated prior to trial.334  Some of these prisoners are kept in
solitary confinement to prevent them from tampering with witnesses, or to
pressure them to confess.335  Overall, the remand prisoners sent to solitary
confinement have “slightly better base expectancy rates for psychological or
psychiatric illnesses (as well as IQ) than average nonisolated remand prison-
ers.”336  Smith attributes this to the fact that isolated remand prisoners are
typically involved in “organized crime” and “relatively complicated cases,”
which results in a “slightly better psychological profile” than nonisolated
remand prisoners.337  Therefore, all other things being equal, one would
326 See, e.g., Craig Haney, Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOL-
OGY 285, 291 (2018) [hereinafter Haney, Restricting] (listing several European studies com-
paring the psychological well-being of prisoners subjected to solitary confinement to that
of prisoners not subjected to such conditions).
327 See id. at 292–93 (citing Craig Haney, The Dimensions of “Social Death”: Psychologi-
cal Reactions to Extremely Long-Term Solitary Confinement (2017) (unpublished
manuscript)).
328 See id. at 292 n.2.
329 See id. at 292.
330 See id. at 292–93.
331 See id. at 293.
332 See id.
333 See Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement, supra note 164, at 453.
334 Id. at 444.
335 Id. at 442.
336 Id. at 454.
337 Id.  Although Smith is not explicit on this point, it may be the case that involvement
in organized criminal activity requires a more stable psychological profile than do crimes
of opportunity.  In any event, the key point is that the remand prisoners committed to
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expect to find “a similar or perhaps lower prevalence of psychiatric morbid-
ity”338 among isolated remand prisoners than among remand prisoners not
subjected to isolation.  If these expectations were proven false, and there
were a higher prevalence of psychiatric morbidity among isolated than
nonisolated prisoners, this would strongly suggest that isolation is not merely
correlated with heightened suffering, but actually causes it.
Studies of Danish and Norwegian remand prisoners showed precisely
this effect.  For example, in 1995, researchers conducted a longitudinal study
of the effects of solitary confinement on Norwegian remand prisoners.339
The study used a sample of fifty-four prisoners, half of whom were kept in
isolation, and half of whom were not in isolation.340  At the outset of the
study, “the isolation group was healthier (both physically and mentally) than
the control group.”341  The study “excluded inmates with a known intoler-
ance for solitary confinement.”342  Thus, the study was designed to show the
effects of solitary confinement on prisoners who are at least as healthy and
capable of tolerating social deprivation as other inmates.  The results showed
that “[t]hose in solitary confinement suffered significantly more both physi-
cally and psychologically than the prisoners in the control group (sleepless-
ness, concentration problems, anxiety, depressions, etc.).  The isolated
prisoners were given and used much more medication than the control
group.”343
In 1994, researchers performed a larger-scale longitudinal study of 367
Danish remand prisoners.344  This study also showed significantly higher
rates of psychiatric morbidity among isolated than nonisolated prisoners.345
In the first stage of the study, nonisolated prisoners showed a psychiatric
morbidity rate of 15%, those who had been in solitary confinement less than
two months showed a morbidity rate of 28%, and those who had been in
solitary confinement more than two months showed a morbidity rate of
43%.346  The psychiatric health of the nonisolated prisoners gradually
increased over the course of the initial phase of the study, while the condi-
solitary confinement are at least as psychologically healthy as the control group kept in the
general population.  This makes it possible to directly compare the effect of the two types
of imprisonment on their mental health.
338 Id.
339 See id. at 477.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.  Six of the excluded inmates were placed in solitary confinement despite their




346 Id.  Although these differences are dramatic, Smith concludes that the overall psy-
chiatric morbidity rate might have been suppressed by the fact that inmates were given
hours of intensive social interaction throughout the period of the study, thus reducing the
isolation the inmates experienced. Id. at 478.
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tion of the isolated prisoners remained the same.347  Once removed from
isolation, the psychiatric health of the previously isolated group improved.348
The second part of the 1994 Danish study showed even more dramatic
results.349  This part of the study surveyed hospitalization among remand
prisoners. The survey sampled 124 remand prisoners who had been hospital-
ized.350  It showed that if “a person remained in SC [solitary confinement]
for four weeks the likelihood of being admitted to the prison hospital for a
psychiatric reason was about twenty times as high as for a person remanded
in nSC [nonsolitary confinement] for the same period of time.”351
Finally, in 1997, researchers performed a follow-up to the 1994 study,
surveying participants as to the effects of their remand confinement.352
Between 36 and 38% of those exposed to solitary confinement described the
experience as “extraordinarily straining,” as compared to 12% of those who
were kept in the general population.353  Between 23 and 27% of those
exposed to solitary confinement reported “severe psychological reactions”
after their remand imprisonment, as compared to 9% of those kept in the
general population.354
These Danish and Norwegian studies showed that solitary confinement
is not merely correlated with suffering, but causes it.  These studies showed
that prisoners not subjected to isolation displayed hedonic adaptation—that
is, their psychological well-being improved over the course of their confine-
ment.  Prisoners kept in isolation, on the other hand, suffered psychological
harm that worsened over the course of their time in isolation.
To be sure, the rates of morbidity for Norwegian and Danish remand
prisoners were not as high as the rates we saw in the Haney and Grassian
supermax studies, but then there are significant differences between the two
types of incarceration.  As Peter Scharff Smith points out, the remand prison-
ers did not suffer the same degree of isolation as supermax prisoners, their
periods of isolation were significantly shorter than the isolation suffered by
many supermax inmates, and perhaps most importantly, they knew that their
isolation would end relatively quickly, when their cases went to trial.355
Supermax prisoners, by contrast, often have no idea when or whether they
will ever be released from solitary confinement.  As Haney’s study shows,
both the prevalence and intensity of psychopathological symptoms displayed
by American prisoners subjected to long-term extreme solitary confinement
347 Id. at 478.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 479.
350 Id.
351 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dorte Sestoft et al., Impact of Solitary Confine-
ment on Hospitalization Among Danish Prisoners in Custody, 21 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 103
(1998)).
352 Id. at 480.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 See id. at 443, 446.
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are extraordinarily high as compared to long-term prisoners not subjected to
such conditions.356
D. Is Solitary Confinement a Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
The empirical literature confirms what the historical record also tends to
show: long-term solitary confinement causes mental suffering so extreme that
a large proportion of the people subjected to it suffer severe psychological
damage that worsens over time.  Human beings are not beasts or gods.  We
need at least some social interaction.  Because long-term solitary confine-
ment is significantly more harmful than imprisonment involving some social
interaction, it is cruel and unusual.
CONCLUSION—CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
This Article has demonstrated two things: first, although it might not
always be obvious at the outset whether an experimental punishment is cruel
and unusual, usage over time can allow us to make this determination.
Usage over time reveals the effects of the punishment and shows whether the
punishment has achieved a stable societal consensus in its favor over multiple
generations.357  Second, long-term solitary confinement is a failed experi-
ment and is cruel and unusual.  It has never achieved universal reception,
but has been tried and rejected as its cruel effects became clear.358  The his-
torical record and the empirical literature both show that it is significantly—
indeed extraordinarily—harsher and more harmful than imprisonment
involving some degree of social interaction.359
The methodology used in this Article will be useful whenever the rela-
tionship of a new punishment practice to the tradition is not immediately
clear.  Its applicability is most obvious when the government adopts a new
method of punishment, but it can also be useful when the government
engages in one of the other kinds of experiment mentioned at the beginning
of this Article.360  When a legislature creates a new crime, for example, it may
not be immediately obvious whether the punishment authorized for this
crime is cruel and unusual.  Paying attention to how adoption and enforce-
ment of the new or revised crime plays out in practice over time can help
clarify the constitutional question.
For example, strict-liability felonies—which allow significant punishment
without any showing of blameworthy conduct or intent—appear to be incon-
sistent with traditional standards of culpability and proportionality.
Although many legislatures have created such crimes, over time there has
been a political and judicial reaction against them, and courts have made
356 See Haney, Restricting, supra note 326, at 292–93.
357 See supra Parts II–III.
358 See supra Part II.
359 See supra Parts II–III.
360 See supra Introduction.
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efforts to limit their scope.361  Such crimes might be subject to constitutional
challenge.362  Other kinds of expansion—for example, elimination of the
marital exemption for rape—appear much more consistent with traditional
standards of culpability and proportionality.363  Although the marital rape
exemption still survives in some states to some degree, we appear to be
approaching a stable societal consensus in favor of eliminating it.364  Elimina-
tion of the marital rape exemption appears much less likely to be subject to
constitutional challenge.
This Article also shows that the various methods of punishment the gov-
ernment employs, and the possible forms of cruelty associated with them, are
interconnected.  Cruelty can lead to cruelty.  Overcrowding in prisons can
cause such suffering that it might be considered cruel and unusual.365  So
can failure to provide treatment for the physically or mentally ill.366  So can
physical abuse at the hands of prison guards.367  Such examples of cruelty
can also have knock-on effects, leading to prison disruptions that create a
perceived need for further cruelty such as long-term solitary confinement.368
This implies that the elimination of one form of cruelty can ameliorate the
need for another.  To the extent that prisons avoid overcrowding, provide
care for the medical needs of their inmates, and treat them with a modicum
of human dignity, there will be a reduced need for drastic “prison control”
measures like supermax.  There are two ways to achieve these goals: improve
funding, training, and oversight; or reduce the number of people subject to
imprisonment.  Given the dramatic human cost of cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and given the constitutional command to avoid them, such actions
should be given the highest legislative priority.
361 See generally, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 653 (2012).
362 See id. at 687.
363 See, e.g., Jill E. Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2000).
364 See id. at 1375.
365 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011).
366 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
367 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986).
368 See supra Section II.D.  A similar phenomenon occurred at the beginning of the
nineteenth century.  As Myra Glenn has described, when New York created its penitentiary
system, the legislature initially prohibited flogging.  As prisons became overcrowded, how-
ever, the prison population became increasingly unruly and as a result, the legislature
authorized flogging once again. See GLENN, supra note 118, at 10–11.
